Country-specific information
ICT4COP conducted research in 12 countries. Learn about our work in each region and country.
Africa
In Africa, our research concentrates on Somalia, Somaliland, Kenya and Uganda. The work package has analyzed institutional, political, social and cultural constraints and opportunities for operationalizing community-oriented policing (COP) in these three countries.
The research includes both analyses of the development and implementation of police reforms and COP initiatives, in addition to the relationship between police and local people in specific environments (e.g. urban, remote, coastal), and population sectors (e.g. youth, women).
Another important aspect for the work package has been to assess the ways in which perceptions of security and justice shift according to environmental or structural factors, and to how ICT and other innovations might contribute to improving community trust in police.
For further information, refer to Work Package 7: AfricaKenya
Contextual Information
In 1963, Kenya declared its independence after 68 years of British colonial rule, inheriting a colonial administration. Kenya has a long history of tension between its various ethnic groups, and as a sovereign nation, it has continued to struggle with ethnic tensions and rivalries. Following the election season of 2007, these tensions culminated in riots, looting, and violence between groups resulting in an estimated 1,200 killed and 350,000 internally displaced. At least 400 of these casualties are thought to have been carried out by police who were accused of operating with an indiscriminate ‘shoot to kill’ policy, particularly in opposition strongholds in Kisumu City and Western Kenya. In the aftermath of this violence, the UN involved itself in mediation efforts. This prompted the start of police reforms and resulted in the formation of a coalition government with a new constitution in 2010.
In the new constitution, the Kenyan National Police Service (NPS) remains the chief security provider. However, the NPS has struggled with a lack of resources and insufficient training. Additionally, due to historical accusations of brutality and corruption, it is seen as being concerned solely with the protection of the government and politicians and is viewed with distrust by the Kenyan people.
In rural parts of Kenya, security is also provided by the Kenyan Police Reserve (KPR), which consists of volunteers with minimal training and equipment. In recent years, there are frequent reports of the KPR taking on paid roles as private security guards, and even of armed KPR members taking part in banditry and livestock raiding.
Various non-state security providers exist in Kenya. Due to the perceived corruption of state security forces, individuals and businesses commonly hire private security companies for protection. Some community-based organizations may also employ youth to provide security and other basic services to communities in exchange for payment. In the informal settlements of Nairobi, gangs (such as the mungiki) may force citizens to pay tributes in exchange for security, while simultaneously constituting a source of insecurity, being involved in murder, extortion, and racketeering.
Security may also be obtained through cultural organizations, such as from a tribal chief or religious leader. Justice provision also frequently occurs through informal channels, particularly in areas where there is less police presence or legitimacy. For instance, a chief might settle domestic disputes for their tribe, or in other areas, mob justice may prevail.
Human Security Concerns
The population of Kenya faces many insecurities that vary depending upon gender, age, ethnicity, class, and location. There is a broad rural/urban divide in Kenya that is reflected in police services, with rural areas being vastly underserved. As a result, rural Kenyans face a threat to their livelihoods, with forcible claiming of land and resources by more powerful actors. In urban areas, petty and violent crime, kidnapping, and murder by gangs threaten the general population; assault, rape, and other forms of gender-based violence threaten the security of women, while youth are threatened by unemployment and may be conscripted to commit crimes. Additionally, the militant Islamist organization Al Shabaab poses a threat in the form of large-scale terrorist attacks in Kenya. Heavy-handed government responses to this threat have triggered recruitment of youth to these organizations. For more information, see the policy brief below.
It is important to note that the police are also considered to be a source of human insecurity for Kenyan civilians – in one area, citizens estimated over 25% of crimes to have been committed by police. Beyond widespread corruption, police have been implicated in a number of abuses of power, including excessive force and extrajudicial killings (particularly among Muslim youth and other ethnic minorities), sexual and gender-based violence against women, and endangering the identities of confidential informants in exchange for payment. Many of these issues are highlighted in the following Digital Story:
Work with the Community, Not your Weapons (Kenya) - Narrated by Ingvild Gjelsvik
Status of Police Reform and COP
Since 2005, Kenya has seen multiple formal launches of COP, with community policing being designated as one of the main planks of police service delivery following the constitutional reform of 2010. Kenya currently has two ongoing programs: Community Police Councils (CPCs) and Nyumba Kumi (NK).
Formed under the National Police Act of 2011, County Policing Committees are county-level organizations under the County Policing Authority (CPA), which is mandated with making security policies and placing a civilian in charge of COP efforts. CPCs are meant to be representative of different segments of the population. They contain a civilian chair and police vice chair, allowing for the community and police to regularly meet, solve problems, and coordinate training and activities to promote security.
The second program, NK, builds on a system developed in post-colonial Tanzania, where clusters of ten houses each have a governmental representative (Nyumba Kumi means ‘ten houses’ in Swahili). NK was introduced by the President’s office in 2013 to fight terrorism and insecurity by organizing households to provide security-related information, promote local leadership, and improve communication between citizens, police, and government through an upwards reporting structure. However, NK has been accused by the local communities of being an intelligence gathering tool used by the president’s office.
This arrangement of having two concurrent COP models has led to some confusion, prompting efforts to merge the concepts by placing NK clusters under the CPA structure. However, these efforts have led to enmity between police and NK structural leaders (such as county commissioners). In 2014, the policies of the CPA were amended to block some of its important COP functions, giving powers to the executive, and slowing down people-centered policing. The adoption of a people-centered approach to policing in Kenya will require a shift from the colonial legacy of a police primarily concerned with protecting the state.
See our digital story:People-centered policing (Kenya) - Narrated by Douglas Brand.
With regards to ICT, Nairobi is considered a regional technology leader. Mobile ownership is near universal. Several innovative ICT solutions meant to bolster security have been developed, tested, and used. The Kenyan police also utilize social media such as Twitter and Facebook to communicate and collaborate with the public by broadcasting police intelligence to facilitate arrests. Emergency call hotlines and increased surveillance cameras represent other ICT-based efforts to promote security. However, these are underutilized and insufficiently maintained, respectively.
Somalia
Contextual Information
Somalia’s history as a state has been beset by fragmentation along clan lines, particularly following Somalia’s period of totalitarian dictatorship (1969-1991). Moreover, Somalia has experienced near constant conflict, instability and displacement of certain parts of its population. Somali society takes place largely at the family unit (or clan), where one’s clan largely determines one’s relationship with their neighbors, as well as which security providers are available to them. This has led to a legally pluralistic society, where formal, traditional, and religious justice mechanisms are utilized – with the line distinguishing different actors being much more permeable than in other societies. Additionally, it is worth noting Somalia’s strong oral tradition, which strongly favors face-to-face communication.
Politics influence the availability and behavior of the Somali state police force (SPF) in each region differently, and the police is often beset by severe corruption. The repressive nature of the police during Somalia’s dictatorship, which was based on totalitarian legislation, left a legacy that continues to influence police behavior, leading to very low levels of trust among citizens. The police may operate alongside hired, often clan-based militias hired by district commissioners or businessmen – indeed, the boundaries between these police and militias are often unclear. In some areas, the police are considered an occupying power, while in rural areas they may be wholly absent. In general, politicians direct police focus upon addressing the presence of the armed factions such as militant Islamist organization Al Shabaab, resulting in a militant policing style that addresses immediate physical security. Al Shabaab, which emerged as a radical wing of Somalia’s (now-defunct) Islamic Court System, has been labelled as a terrorist by international governments and has wielded significant control over much of Somalia especially in rural areas. However, Al Shabaab also provides an element of security as some groups of the population turn to them for protection.
While Somalia’s courts are based upon Islamic Sharia law, in areas outside the control of Somalia’s regional administrations, clan law (or, xeer), serves as the primary justice system. Xeer describes a localized set of rules developed by clan elders to promote peace between neighboring clans and is often employed to regulate civil affairs. Despite the antagonism between the police and warlords, the latter may provide some degree of conflict resolution in the areas under its control, in instances where elders are unable to address a problem.
Human Security Concerns
The pluralistic and divided state of Somalia has resulted in a situation where all groups are affected by insecurity, albeit in different ways, at an immediate physical level where there is an ongoing threat to people’s bodies and property. Al-Shabaab frequently deploys suicide bombers, car bombs, grenades and mortars against the public – often these are targeted at authority, figures, businessmen, state representatives, police and tax collectors, but indiscriminately kill civilians.
Women in Somalia face extreme physical insecurity, often in danger of physical assault, early forced marriage, forced female genital mutilation, domestic violence, domestic assault, lack of access to shelter, sexual violence, and rape. Meanwhile, young men in Somalia are excluded from political participation due to cultural custom of elder leadership and are often marginalized by their elders and abandoned by their clans if this is challenged.
These factors, along with the fact that 73% of the country falls under the poverty line and up to 54% of the population is unemployed, make these youth particularly vulnerable to recruitment by al Shabaab as they seek purpose and belonging. Finally, individuals who have been displaced due to conflict (IDPs) often lose any clan protection that they might have, rendering them particularly vulnerable as they may lack access to security provision.
Status of Police Reforms and COP
There has been a lot of international attention toward police reform in Somalia. The EU, China, Turkey, Japan, the US, UK, and UAE have all had various involvement in technical police reform, yet the most present organizations in the region are AMISOM, DFID, and efforts by individual donors. The focus of this reform has been mainly on addressing the serious security issues in relation to Al Shabaab’s militancy. Police reform initiatives that have been implemented essentially amount to efforts to promote basic policing services. These reforms have had some positive results, and have improved the reputation of the Somali police. However, there is rampant corruption within the police, and the police is vulnerable to infiltration by Al Shabaab and other militant groups.
Although limited, there have also been reform initiatives to promote COP. For example, in the Waberi district, security is partially provided at the community level by locally developed Neighborhood watch schemes, which are involved in intelligence gathering and community safety.
Although neighborhood watch schemes had some success, they have since been hindered by local political dynamics. The Ministry of Internal Security’s ‘Know Your Neighbor’ campaign promoted local security collaboration, where community representatives were appointed to record suspicious activities – these were then fed to a neighborhood team, and then onward to the police.
Among the more effective initiatives are those that are locally-focused and operate at a small scale to address a specific need – for instance, in the late 90’s, community-based vigilante groups known as ‘madani’ were created, first by businessmen and later by civil society organizations, to address crime in residential areas of Mogadishu independently of police. These madani consisted of local residents (ideally in neighborhood units of 300 households) who paid a monthly fee into a ‘vigilante group scheme’ that would employ a militia to capture criminals and deliver them to sharia courts – however, today the number of functioning madani has dwindled considerably, possibly due to issues of funding.
There have been few initiatives based around ICT to promote COP – although Somalis are avid users of social media, the fear of calls being intercepted by either al Shabaab or Somalia’s national intelligence agency NISA, ICT is rarely used to contact the police. Additionally, links between the largest telecommunications company and the government have made citizens are reluctant to report sensitive information. Despite the existence of an emergency phone line and a rape crisis line initiated by NGOs, these have had seen limited use.
Somaliland
Contextual information
Somaliland is a self-declared state. From 1884 to 1960, Somaliland was a British protectorate that then voluntarily united with the formerly Italian colony of Somalia until its declaration of independence in 1991. Today, Somaliland claims to be the successor state to British Somaliland and is internationally considered to be an autonomous territory of Somalia.
The Somaliland Police is the main provider of security alongside the Somaliland Armed Forces. Somaliland exists in a state of legal pluralism, with three justice systems: the state, which consists of courts and police, religious law, including the sharia courts, and the ethnicity-based clan system. Although all three are respected, they are not interchangeable, such that one cannot switch systems during or after a legal proceeding. Relations between the government and community are regarded as acceptable by Somalilanders, due to the relative stability and security of Somaliland. In general, there is skepticism of cooperating with the state, as historically a system of local councils was devised as a method of managing the clans (and is thus linked to being a method of population control).
The police operate under a militarized culture with a legacy of oppression that can be traced back to authoritarian Mussolini-era Italian law. However, much of control is left to clans, as police may work part-time and be absent in rural, remote, or coastal areas. The police may also refrain from involvement in conflicts that involve divisions between clans, for example conflicts over land and resources. Communities are largely expected to take responsibility of everyday security through informal mechanisms, with elders often acting as intermediaries between state authorities and local populations. Other local initiatives also exist to supplement or fill the gaps left by state-led security provision. For instance, community-funded groups and neighborhood watches provide security for their communities, and ‘guard men’ are hired to minimize theft.
Human Security Concerns
Although Somaliland hasn’t experienced the same degree of insecurity as Somalia, the country remains in a situation where civil society is weak, politicians are unaccountable, radicalization is an issue, and press freedom is limited.
In Hargeisa, the capital city of Somaliland, a high percentage of its population is subject to physical insecurity, with rampant street crime, frequent disputes over land and buildings, a proliferation of weapons, and increasing youth gang problems. Unemployment and clan-related tensions increase insecurity, and women are vulnerable to robbery and rape. This insecurity is exacerbated by an influx of immigrants to the city including IDPs affected by conflict, individuals fleeing conflict in Yemen, and members of the diaspora returning from abroad. The result of this is that physical security is pursued in a reactive fashion, rather than a preemptive pursuit of human security.
Status of Police Reform and COP
Somaliland’s government received assistance to improve police-community relationships from UNDP in 2011 and the UK’s DFID in 2015. However, these have gained little traction, as they have tended to take place in cycles and tend to focus on broad liberal goals rather than directly addressing issues of police-community relations. Still, these efforts are tolerated, as they tend to supply the police with desirable resources and promote a democratic and professional image internationally. In general, the lack of a conception of any ‘community’ beyond the clan level presents serious challenges for the support of COP in Somaliland.
Finally, although local Somalilanders have access to mobile phones, ICT solutions have not had success, due to the costs of sending messages, low literacy levels, and a tendency toward face-to-face communication, demonstrating that local norms and preferences can negate possible applications of globalized technology.
For more information, see ICT4COP’s policy brief by Alice Hills (Durham University):Uganda
Contextual Information
The challenges involved with policing in Uganda predate the countries independence from British colonial rule in 1962. When the country was united, the largest kingdom in the southern ‘Buganda’ region was disinterested in complying with the largely northern-dominated central government. These tensions entrenched themselves into a north/south divide that has led to violent conflicts, (including the 1971 military coup of Idi Amin) and is still present to this day. In this arena of insecurity, new actors such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) with their own agendas have emerged as a source of further insecurity in the region. Today, trust in the government is low, and corruption, chronic under-funding, and politicisation of the police has led to declining police efficacy. While the public’s view of the police is often negative, it is improved since Amin’s era, and is viewed as the primary security provider in the country.
Beyond the police, other government institutions are relied upon for security and justice provision in Uganda. For instance, Local Councils (LCs) play a central role in providing knowledge and insight to the police. A number of informal conflict resolution mechanisms operate through the LC system – for instance, chiefs and religious leaders, may be consulted to settle household affairs (such as disagreements or domestic violence) and land-related conflicts. Beyond their involvement in settling such disputes, local cultural and religious leaders play an important role as contact points for civilians to access politicians, government, and police. Given Uganda’s history with insecurity during political transitions, historically governments have hired what they call ‘crime preventers’ – local community members (often youth) who are trained to “provide security” during elections. Although these groups are officially disbanded after elections, they are still occasionally used by state actors including police. However, they are not seen as being legitimate by the citizenry, as they have been known to commit violence against government dissidents and members of vulnerable groups.
Human Security Concerns
As previously mentioned, the socio-cultural and political impacts of the colonial era are still present in Uganda, and have resulted in various, often ethnically based conflicts. This has been exacerbated by the emergence of the LRA, which has posed the main source of insecurity for the population over the past decades. They have burnt down villages, abducted children, raped, killed, and forced children to kill their parents. In Northern Uganda, this insecurity resulted in the wide displacement of the local population, which in turn led to land-related conflicts.
The decline in police efficiency has been accompanied by rising crime across Uganda, particularly in the mid 2010’s, often from financially-motivated criminal groups, including the formerly-mentioned. “crime preventers”. Violent crimes, including armed robbery, murder, and kidnap for ransom have become more common in Kampala and other urban areas. Crime rates tend to be higher near the border with South Sudan, where weapons may be more easily obtainable. This situation also has led to detrimental issues of human security, including alcoholism and drug abuse (which in turn has led to further issues like rape and defilement). Attacks by both police and vigilantes have made homosexuals particularly vulnerable.
In urban areas, many children and youth have been made homeless due to domestic violence and neglect, only to face brutality and exploitation on the streets. In the Gulu region of Northern Uganda especially, these youth are stigmatized and often form groups that are broadly regarded as criminal – occasionally they are hired to conduct criminal activity for individuals or organizations that wish to remain removed from the crime. Additionally, women in Gulu report feeling unsafe, particularly in the early morning, at night, and during harvest season. The police are commonly viewed to be a source of this insecurity.
Status of Police Reform and COP
Although COP-like policing has existed in some form since Uganda’s independence, there have been few modern innovations. Instead, there has been a continuation and revival of past concepts. The most recent COP-like initiatives introduced in 2014 were described as an effort to move away from colonial models of policing, and to focus on the Local Council level of security provision. This includes LC representatives joining the police on foot and motor patrols at night and conducting joint sensitivity and leadership training with police at schools, in community meetings, and on local radio programs. This programming is primarily focused on creating awareness about law and order, and the role of police.
The police and community also have utilized ICT and newer technology to improve information transfer. Ugandan police have used Twitter since 2016, and are active on Facebook to share stories, investigations, and press statements. In some regions, COP has been harnessed to tap into community knowledge, and is seen as an instrument for education and responsibility, with some surveillance opportunities. Cell phones have been used to communicate directly with police and to provide recordings of criminal acts to police.
Central America
In Central America, we conducted research in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. We analyzed reasons explaining the different development histories of the police in these three countries, and studied the peculiarities of the community-oriented policing programs established.
A core aim is to establish what constitutes “legitimate” policing in the eyes of the citizenry in these countries, and why it has been difficult to sustain community-oriented policing programs at the national level.
For further information, refer to Work Package 9: Central America.El Salvador
Contextual Information
El Salvador is among the most violent countries in the world. The civil war that lasted through most of the 1980’s ended with a Peace Agreement in 1992. As a result, the economy collapsed, leading to widespread migration. Simultaneously, many Salvadorans who had previously fled to the US were forced to return. Some of these returnees had joined violent gangs during their time in the US and subsequently established similar criminal activity in El Salvador. This has led to an environment in which criminal gangs and drug traffickers constitute a serious security threat.
The major state security providers, the military and the National Civilian Police (PNC), have responded to gang insecurity with militarized and brutal policing tactics, often failing to differentiate between the gangs involved or the crimes that have been committed. At the same time, police corruption leads to extremely low levels of trust from communities. Another security provider can be found in Community Development Associations (ADESCOS), which consist of groups of citizens that work with municipalities to coordinate and implement projects and exchange information with the PNC regarding suspicious activities and individuals, thus serving as a security provider– particularly in rural areas.
El Salvador has other non-state security providers, albeit ones that often undermine the security of the population. The gangs that constitute a major threat to the physical security of individuals also provide security to some degree within their territories against rival gangs. They are known to use brutal measures to punish offences (such as cutting off hands) and create a system in which it can be dangerous for an individual to cross over gang territory lines. Drug traffickers constitute a separate security entity altogether – often they will provide security to civilians in the sense that they will attempt to intimidate gang members into abandoning territory in order to avoid police confrontation. Finally, ex-guerilla vigilantes that were engaged in resistance during El Salvador’s war period have formed security councils that patrol communities – particularly those that were directly tied to war resistance.
Human Security Concerns
The principal security concern that threatens security for all in El Salvador revolves around criminal activity, primarily conducted by gangs and drug traffickers. In the period following the war, the expansion of gang activity and the demobilization of combatants and widespread circulation of weapons among the citizenry all took place amidst a security vacuum. This situation, coupled with El Salvador’s strategic position to drug traffickers, allowed criminal organizations to obtain a large degree of power that has resulted in physical insecurity so severe, that any place outside of the home is dangerous. Extortion, burglary, carjacking, and disappearances frequently occur, and El Salvador has consistently had among the highest homicide rates in the world. Although homicides and crime were initially contained to urban areas, this trend is reversing, with violence and killings expanding into rural areas. This instability has brought major socioeconomic consequences, including widespread poverty and unemployment.
Beyond general crime and poverty, certain groups in El Salvador face other forms of insecurity. Women are especially vulnerable – in one 2017 study, over 67% of women reported experiencing physical or sexual violence during their lifetime, with 33% reporting violence in the past month. This is attributed to a common lack of recognition of women’s human rights, and the tendency for women to be viewed as sexual objects that may be blamed for any crimes committed against them.
Transgender and homosexuals in El Salvador also face mental and physical abuse as well as discrimination – a type of violence that is “invisible” to society. For more information, watch our digital story:
A Tale of Invisibility (El Salvador) - Narrated by Erika Rojas
State of Police Reform and COP
Although the original Peace Accords that inspired the creation of the PNC contained language that proposed a police service grounded in the community, this vision has not been realized for the police of El Salvador. Leftist and rightist groups alike that have assumed executive power have driven police toward more tactical and repressive strategies, and the country’s increase in crime levels have only exacerbated this trend. For instance, in 2016 El Salvador unveiled its Special Forces division, which combined military and police units for joint operations to fight criminal gangs in rural areas. This movement towards a more militarized police force has undermined COP efforts that are perceived by the police as being ‘softer’, or ‘feminine’. Communities are thus met with two opposing practices of policing, making them less likely to trust and work with police. Additionally, communities are reluctant to cooperate or even talk to the police due to the risk of gang retaliation.
Still, COP has seen some degree of implementation in El Salvador. In 2014, the Community Police Program was introduced, which provided relevant community training to 21,000 police members who were deployed over the 7 zones and 42 sectors of the capital San Salvador to ascertain security issues and potential action plans. Later, in 2015, the comprehensive 10-year Plan El Salvador Seguro (PESS) initiative was launched by El Salvador’s National Council on Citizen Security which included efforts to strengthen institutions responsible for human security. This initiative has been touted for its success in decreasing homicides, although other experts say this decrease merely represents an increase in gang sophistication to avoid anti-gang police measures.
Guatemala
Contextual Information
With a history of dictatorship, military violence, and civil war from the 1960’s onward, Guatemala’s security situation remains complex, with a police force that is untrusted by much of the population, and sophisticated organized crime networks. Although the 1985 constitution ended the rule of an overtly authoritarian government and established the state’s main duty to be the protection of the individual, the state police (PNC) is underfunded, and until 2016 relied upon the military for support. As a result, the police are largely unable to provide consistent service across the entirety of the country, leading many Guatemalans to rely on alternate non-state security providers.
Guatemala has an abundance of private security companies (outnumbering state police by nearly 3 to 1) that businesses and individuals hire for protection against violent gangs. Many of these companies are led by former military officers, and, although they are generally considered reputable, there have been allegations of such companies permitting crimes to perpetuate their business. Gangs in Guatemala may also be considered to provide security, although this is frequently imposed through an extortion system known as ‘renta’, in which payment is demanded of civilians in order to avoid being attacked (either from the gang demanding payment, or a rival gang). In some regions of Guatemala with larger indigenous populations, traditional forms of local governance are followed, with police being held accountable to these structures. Informal justice providers include religious leaders, indigenous leaders, local elders, and, in instances where police are absent or overpowered, through violent ‘mob justice’.
To learn more about indigenous institutions and their role in security provision in Guatemala, watch our digital story:The Role of Indigenous Institutions in Guatemala - Narrated by Arturo Matute
Human Security Concerns
Overall, the population of Guatemala faces high levels of poverty and social inequality that has resulted in mass migrations into Guatemala City from rural areas, as well as immigration out of the country. Guatemala has some of the lowest levels of literacy, education, and employment in Latin America, particularly among the most vulnerable groups in society (such as youth, women, and indigenous groups). There are also high levels of discrimination within the country based around ethnic and socioeconomic differences. Insecurity varies between urban and rural regions of the country, as land- and homeowners in rural areas risk being deprived of vital resources or even being forced off their own land by more powerful actors.
However, undoubtedly the greatest threat to the security of Guatemala’s population is in the form of crime that affects physical security, with homicide and femicide being all too common – although it is worth noting that homicidal violence has been reduced by 50% over the past decade. Theft is a common occurrence in urban areas and is often carried out through violence or intimidation in high traffic areas. Women face frequent sexual harassment, assault, groping in public and domestic violence, while youth may be targeted by gangs for recruitment purposes, bullied verbally and physically by their peers, and may resort to drug abuse. Although rural areas tend to be less subject to violent theft, issues such as domestic abuse and alcoholism are elevated in these regions.
State of Police Reform and COP
In 2014, Guatemala established the Community Security Police Model (MOPSIC), which was designed to promote a community policing philosophy among the police, improving police services and building trust with communities. Developed with support from the US Department of State (among other international agencies), MOPSIC was well-established within Guatemala by 2017, but continues to face barriers to its success. Among these are a general lack of clarity on the fundamental concepts of COP, and the belief that COP is either a burdensome central level initiative imposed upon police sub-stations, or that it represents a specific project rather than a general philosophy meant to permeate through all police activity. Other factors hindering the development of a COP culture include physical security issues and a lack of trust in the police. While police have had some success connecting with communities through “door to door” interactions, these types of outreach are more complicated in urban areas, where there is a possibility of dangerous encounters with street gang members. Still, officers continue to be trained in MOPSIC principles, and stationed throughout Guatemala.
MOPSIC explicitly calls for the incorporation of information and communications technologies (ICT) into COP, and proposes a number of possible applications, such as using geo-referencing to promote security through a map of crime hotspots or improving accountability through enhanced police agent reporting. However, many of these programs have barely been established, due to a lack of internet access, ineffective organization, and internal opposition. Currently, the most common use of ICT to promote communication between police and community members is through cell phones, as police will often share their personal phone numbers with community members as a means of offering direct contact.
Nicaragua
Contextual Information
Like many of the countries of Central America, Nicaragua went through a period of authoritarian government, civil war, and revolution, lasting through the 1970’s. Today, it is the second poorest nation in the region, with significant economic disparities and high levels of migration to neighboring countries like Costa Rica. However, this migration has historically stemmed from Nicaraguans seeking improved economic opportunities rather than fleeing from violence. Nicaragua has also had a relatively low crime rate with high levels of trust between communities and the police. This can partially be attributed to the country’s police culture being rooted in a community-based approach – a Community Oriented Policing (COP) model based on outreach, accessibility and accountability was established in 1979 following the Sandinista revolution. However, this has been undermined in the late 2010’s by the Ortega government’s efforts to bolster presidential power by placing public institutions (including the police) directly under its control. A recent turn from COP to a reactive form of policing has undermined trust and heightened tensions between local communities and the police, and contributed to the violent episodes that have taken place in the country in recent months.
Nicaragua’s main state security provider is the National Nicaraguan Police (PNN). The PNN has a significant presence in urban areas and is generally well-connected to communities through strong contacts and working relationships. In rural areas where there is less of a police presence, the military will occasionally step in to provide security. Nicaragua’s primary justice institutions include the Public Ministry, which prosecutes and represents both public interest and victims of crime (although its coverage is limited), the Supreme Court of Justice, which leads the judicial power, and the Public Defense Office which provides legal defense services to those that cannot afford it.
In certain areas of Nicaragua, alternate security and justice providers may be active within communities. These include churches and church leaders, who provide mediation for minor disputes, or youth gangs that provide protective services in rural areas. Additionally, within certain indigenous communities that populate the Atlantic coast, customary indigenous law prevails. Recently it has been reported that it has become increasingly common for Nicaraguans in communities underserved by police to purchase firearms to take the law into their own hands (although this is contested by police).
Human Security Concerns
The vast majority of Nicaraguans report feeling safe in their neighborhoods, due to a perception of police being grounded in their communities. However, trust in police has fallen in recent years (as of 2020), after a 2014 motion in which police control was turned over to the president. Despite a generally positive perception of physical security, robberies of homes and businesses pose a problem, as well as increasing levels of drug use. While women experience unwanted sexual attention on the streets (verbal taunts, gestures, or actions) there are relatively few violent crimes against women reported (rape, physical assault, armed assault, etc.). Other criminal concerns revolve around drug and human trafficking, as well as money laundering.
However, the top insecurities that Nicaraguans face are economic in nature (with rural Nicaraguans reporting the highest levels of insecurity): poverty, high food prices, and unemployment. Although poverty levels in Nicaragua decreased significantly in the 90’s, overall poverty rates have increased in the 21st century, partially as a result of population growth, natural disasters and the distortion of commodity prices in the international market. Along the Atlantic coast there have been increased instances of violent “land grabbing” from indigenous and afro-descended communities by internal migrants. Additionally, drug cartels from other Central American countries have tried to gain a foothold in the region to aid in the trafficking of narcotics.
Following changes made to the National Security Policy of Nicaragua and moves by the president to recentralize power under the Sandinista political party, public demonstrations have increasingly been repressed. In 2018, protests that began over pension reforms and a lack of sufficient government response to forest fires are estimated to have left over 300 dead. The police and members of the Sandinista political party are reported to have carried out a series of unlawful arrests and detentions of members of the political opposition, including protesting students. In general, Nicaraguan security is decreasing, and a rising percentage feel that the police are not doing their job correctly.
State of Police Reform and COP
After the Sandinista revolution in 1979, the Sandinista Police was established, and throughout the 1980’s was tasked with preventing crime and counter-revolutionary activities with a strong foundation of participation from the public. In the 1980’s, the National Police implemented the concept of public security as its principal doctrine, establishing the ideals of policing as being communitarian, proactive and preventative. This was accompanied by improvements in human resources, training, candidate selection, and gender equity.
As such, the National Police have had several structural initiatives oriented towards strengthening ties between police and the community through broad channels of communication and service. Among these were the creation of Family assemblies (formerly Committees for Citizen Power), which served as points of articulation between police and families, and appointments of jefes de sector (heads of sector), who served as specialists in public neighborhood security. Increased rural and municipal coverage, judicial assistance, policies for the prevention of youth violence, and the creation of Mother and Child stations provided integrated attention to victims and survivors of intra-family and sexual violence. Additionally, the police have sought for the institutionalization of gender awareness in police policies and practices to provide better symmetry in relations between women and men within the police, and the articulation of an increased role for women in police work. For more information about COP in Nicaragua, as well as current challenges to its model, read this article.
The Nicaraguan National Police has received funding assistance from the EU and other actors on projects that aim to prevent drugs, crime, and violence, and exchange experience between Nicaraguan and other national police forces. Although information technologies are important to Nicaraguan police, their strategy for Preventative Community Policing relies mostly on “social technologies”. This includes broad channels of communication through community assemblies and direct door-to-door visits with residents. Another relevant committee is the Social Prevention of Crime Committees, with 40,000 members and 143 Cabinets of Citizen Power, which organize assemblies, work with public and private institutions to find solutions to security problems and collaborate on plans to prevent crime. These fluid links allow the community and police to cultivate a close, trusting, and effective relationship, although the changing security context in the country under the Ortega presidency suggests that this may be coming under increasing strain.
South Asia
In Asia, we conducted research in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These two countries offer quite different contexts in terms of the way community-oriented policing is approached. In Afghanistan, police reform has been a part of a larger reform agenda after years of war, where the international community has been a strong contributing actor. In Pakistan on the other hand, conflict has taken the form of military operations in the border regions and terrorist activities elsewhere as well, and there has been no concerted effort by the international community to drive police reform, aside from bilateral assistance.
The work package has given particular attention to exploring issues of trust between the police and the community, including police integrity; and to how ICT and other innovations might contribute to improving community trust in police, both in terms of access of vulnerable groups to services, and in preventing crime and radicalization, particularly of youth.
For further information, refer to Work Package 8: South Asia
Afghanistan
Contextual Information
Throughout its modern history, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has been the site of ongoing armed conflict as internal and external forces have vied for power within its borders. From 1926-1973, Afghanistan was ruled as a constitutional monarchy that largely lacked a central government. This history of decentralization has complicated later centralized state efforts, including those revolving around policing. Competition between Cold War powers in the 1970’s for influence in the country, and the 2001 US Invasion in reaction to the September 11th terrorist attacks provided fertile ground for the emergence of radical Islamic groups: First, Al Qaeda in the late 1980’s, the Taliban in the 1990’s, and from the mid-2010’s, the Islamic State.
The police, with the support of the international community following the Bonn Agreement of 2002, embarked on an extensive reform process. Since then, Afghanistan’s two main state security forces, the National Army and the National Police, have struggled to extend the rule of law to all parts of the country due to security threats from insurgencies and a lack of trust from civilians. While various international organizations have promoted security in Afghanistan (including a US-led coalition, EUPOL, and NATO-led ISAF), this has been characterized by fluctuations in strategy that have hindered sustainable solutions and left the state dependent upon foreign aid. The Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MOI) continues to make efforts to address terrorist activity and crime, despite great local and international uncertainty. The reach of state security actors, including the police, remains limited.
At the same time, a variety of non-state actors play important roles in the lives of most Afghans. Some of these are long-lasting institutions, such as the ‘shura’. The shura is a gathering of selected community members that meet to discuss disputes, mediate on behalf of aggrieved parties, or aim to address larger societal issues within their community such as rampant crime. At local levels, warlords or strongmen may demand payment from individuals and private business in exchange for protection. In some communities, neighborhood watch groups such as the ‘chowkidari’ exist. For more information about the ‘shura’ and the ‘chowkidari’, this ICT4COP article.
Human Security Concerns
The urgent need for the provision of physical security overshadows the broader human security needs of the Afghan population. The danger of constant conflict exacerbates other instabilities, including unemployment, a lack of housing and basic necessities, widespread poverty, high displacement, and migration. A feeling of desperation leads some Afghans to engage in illegal activities such as border smuggling and dealing drugs. In some areas, police are engrained in networks with a variety of actors, each benefiting from the border trade in some way. This network facilitates survival, but also relationships of dependency.
For more information, see our digital story:
A Story of Survival (Afghanistan)
Afghan youth (who comprise over 68% of the population) are particularly susceptible to these activities, with unemployment leading to high levels of drug use and addiction, as well as a higher risk of being conscripted by radical religious groups.
This digital Story shows how the drivers of insecurity for Afghan youth create a vicious circle, and why understanding their interconnectedness is fundamental for meaningfully addressing the day-to-day concerns of Afghan youth:
Fragile Futures (Afghanistan) - Narrated by Jaishankar Ganapathy
Afghanistan’s various ethnic groups experience tension and conflict, particularly between two of the largest groups, the Pashtun and the Hazara. This dynamic is often reflected in Afghanistan’s political landscape, which in turn leads to further conflict over political power.
Women in Afghanistan face gender-based violence including domestic and sexual abuse, and honor-related crimes without any formal recourse or referral process. Minorities may face discrimination, neglect and abuse, even from police, due to their religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. Finally, there are significant differences in the presence and efficacy of police between urban and rural areas, to the extent that some rural areas may be completely removed from the national security efforts.
Status of Police Reform and COP
Afghan police training has occurred under distinct phases, including an initial training period from 2002-2009 and a NATO-led police training mission (known as NTM-A) from 2009-2014. Efforts surrounding police reform and COP in Afghanistan currently operate under the MOI’s 10 Year Strategic Vision (2014-2024) to reform and demilitarize its police forces. This reform has led to improvements in police efficiency through internal structural changes meant to address corruption and improve the chain of command. This includes the establishment of the Police-e-Mardumi (PeM) community policing directorate in 2016. The MOI and PeM have been involved in a number of important initiatives to promote human security through police-community collaboration, including partnering with technical institutions to aid in the provision of services and infrastructure, and partnering with family, educational, and religious institutions to aid in the prevention of crime and implementation of rule of law. Since its establishment, PeM has sought to establish 19 diverse councils in each of the police districts of Kabul that include elders, religious persons, women, youth, students, and police officers to address community issues. Beyond Kabul, PeM has expanded to include offices in the 34 provinces of Afghanistan that incorporate or build upon previously existing shura to enable them to work proactively to prevent crime, in addition to the provision of justice. Although it is too early to observe an impact of these forms on human security, it does attest to a commitment by the government to improve police-community relations. Despite the deteriorating security and political situation since the 2019 elections, the government has continued to roll out these initiatives in the provinces to address human insecurity.
Another important element of police reform in Afghanistan has been the inclusion and protection of women police officers, through initiatives like a women police helpline and the establishment of women police associations. Although only 2% of Afghan police are women, there has been momentum within the MOI to increase this number, through the provision of better education opportunities and working conditions for women in the police. Some of the challenges for women police in Afghanistan can be seen in the following digital story:
Recruit Into Danger (Afghanistan) - Narrated by A. Heather Coyne
There have been numerous efforts by both international and civil society organizations to bolster police services and increase human security. For instance, UNDP has assisted in the establishment of an emergency response system called PERS, provided upgrades to police station infrastructure, and have supported improvements to police training and recruitment. In the six northern provinces, the German organization GIZ has aided in the further creation and expansion of local development shura (community development committees), conducted joint COP training sessions for police and communities, and raised awareness about the role of police in community. Meanwhile, NGO’s have participated in the development of COP historically, running internationally funded projects such as a GIZ-funded project to establish neighborhood watch committees (NWCs) and providing critical feedback of ongoing COP efforts provided by the PeM.
While both local and international reform efforts have aided the promotion of COP in Afghanistan, it is worth noting that these efforts have been heavily impacted by Afghanistan’s security and political situation – as of 2020, 15 of the 19 Kabul councils have been hindered by security threats. Today, the larger security situation in Afghanistan remains fluid. The presidential election of 2019 remains unresolved as of July 2020, with both candidates claiming victory. At the same time, the US has negotiated its withdrawal from the country with the Taliban, without Afghan government involvement, portending an uncertain future for stability and security of Afghanistan.
Pakistan
Contextual Information
Violent conflict has existed in Pakistan in various forms since its independence in 1947, including ongoing border disputes with India in Jammu and Kashmir stemming from the initial division of the two countries, to Taliban insurgency in the Northwest province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) from 2004. Pakistan’s major formal security providers, the armed forces and the police, have been regularly pulled into drawn-out military operations. Unfortunately, they are insufficiently trained and equipped for such operations, which sap security providers of their resources and undermine their efficacy.
Various types of non-state security providers exist alongside and occasionally cooperate with police. Among these is the traditional justice mechanism known as the ‘jirga’. Jirga are dispute resolution committees comprised of local (male) elders who meet to handle local disputes between citizens in accordance with the ethnic Pashtun tradition. There are also jirga that work on a wider scale which may operate out of and be accountable to the local police station. In KP, the jirga have historically played a larger role due to the strength of local structures. Although the jirga have been criticized for lacking a human rights approach or having connections to the Taliban, they retain legitimacy locally and for lack of a better alternative.
In other parts of Pakistan, the Taliban demand payment from businesses and individuals in exchange for security provision (albeit often without local consent). Private security companies are also hired for additional security by institutions and individuals.
Human Security Concerns
Due to efforts by the army, police, and civilian organizations, Pakistan has seen a significant reduction in the level of terroristic activity in recent years. Still, physical insecurity remains a reality for much of the country’s population, with terror attacks, ransom kidnappings, extortion and killings. While there has been investment on the part of police to respond to these threats by modernizing police forces and supporting infrastructure, great discrepancies exist in the quality and degree of services provided to civilians depending upon social connection and power. Additionally, physical location plays a role in the extent of service provision – rural areas are often required to rely more heavily on traditional or non-state security providers.
Beyond physical threats, different groups face significant insecurities stemming largely from widespread unemployment, poverty, and other socioeconomic disparities, the availability of arms, ethnic conflict and religious fanaticism. These challenges put citizens, especially youth, at risk of being radicalized. As an example, in the Swat District in 2005, militants arrived with messages of justice, equal rights, and opportunities for unemployed youth, but were then conscripted to fight in conflicts based in religious jihad.
The following digital Story looks at some of the challenges of radicalization:
Radicalization (Pakistan) - Narrated by Neil Davey
Pakistani women regularly face insecurities such as domestic and sexual violence, and other forms of gender-based violence, but there are challenges in reporting and responding to these crimes, as illustrated in our digital story:
Reporting Gender-Based Violence (Pakistan) - Narrated by Abda Khalid
Minorities and government personnel are also frequently targeted as a result of their religion or profession.
Status of Police Reform and COP
The Pakistan Police is provincially managed. The decentralized structure results in greater police independence, as well as disparities in access to resources, leading to broad variation in the policy including COP approaches. Although the decentralized nature of the police in Pakistan severely limits the degree of influence of national agencies like the National Police Bureau, many positive examples of reform and COP initiatives can be seen on the provincial level.
For instance, the KP government introduced the Police Act 2017 to reconstruct and regulate its police to strive towards an apolitical service, accountable to civilian oversight. Included in this measure is the establishment of committees called Public Liaison Committees (PLCs), to improve communications and relations between police and the public. These PLCs, within which 70% of members are selected from local village councils, may assist police in crime prevention and maintaining public order by informing the police of local tensions and new people entering the area. These PLCs, while effective, initially excluded groups like women and youth – in response to this, police in some areas are working to establish women PLCs, while others specifically recruit youth as active members.
Another important COP initiative introduced by police in KP are the Dispute Resolution Councils (DRCs). Launched in 2014, this initiative linked police with local jirga to allow for joint engagement of communities and to address petty cases, including intermarriage disputes, domestic violence, debts, issues of property or land, etc. By linking with pre-existing community mechanisms, the DRCs build upon structures with legitimacy, increasing the likelihood of their local acceptance, efficacy, and sustainability. However, like PLCs, these have been criticized for gender bias and low representation of women. Still, these efforts are generally acknowledged as a step in the right direction, and an effective example of COP being practiced in Pakistan.
For more on these local institutions, watch the following digital story:
Dispute Resolution Councils in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (Pakistan) - Narrated by Shakir Ullah
Various ICT initiatives in Pakistan assist with COP, including the ‘online first information report’ which allows citizens to register criminal complaints against police over the phone, the citizens portal which allows for complaints to be registered about multiple sectors of service delivery, and other various initiatives that address domestic violence, child abuse and women’s empowerment. However, these ICT initiatives have faced issues – local communities are often unaware of these services, or lack the necessary knowledge, training, or technological access to utilize them. Our research has shown that for these solutions to have an impact, they must be developed with input from the community to ensure that context is taken into consideration and that widely accessible technology is included.
Watch our digital story:
Looking Beyond ICT (Pakistan) - Narrated by Tahir Maqsood
South East Europe
In South-East Europe, we conducted research in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia. This work package has looked in particular at police reform in the three cases, taking into account the central part the rule of law plays in democratization in post-conflict societies. Our research objectives included the evaluation of existing material on community-oriented policing by international organizations and NGOs, and the drafting of context and region specific handbooks of community-oriented policing.
For further information, refer to Work Package 10: South East Europe
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Contextual Information
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) emerged from Yugoslavia in 1995 after the end of the Bosnian War (1992-1995). BiH consists of two entities with extensive autonomy, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska, as well as the small self-governing administrative Brčsko District. Each of these divisions has its own distinct policing structure: the Federation of BiH has a decentralized police with 10 different cantonal police forces, the Republic of Srpska has a separate centralized police, and in the Brčsko District one centralized police, as well as several state-level police agencies.
While the police are considered the primary security provider in BiH, they are accused by the population as being controlled by politicians. Corruption and nepotism are regarded as pervasive across all levels of government. BiH’s state structure and legislative framework is fragmented, and the justice system and law enforcement are ineffective.
Beyond the police, private security companies provide security for businesses, private property, and individuals. These private initiatives are, however, certified, controlled and monitored by the police. The owners of the most important private security companies are reported to have connections with people in power.
Human Security Concerns
Physical security in BiH is relatively stable. The majority of crimes reported include theft and burglary, and occur mostly in urban areas. Organized crime (including trafficking and smuggling) is substantial, and violence among members of such groups is common. These groups have access to military grade weapons still present in the country from the period of war. Still, socioeconomic concerns remain the greatest source of insecurity for the population of BiH.
Radicalization is also a concern. This includes young people joining religious extremist groups in Syria, as well as nationalist extremists who rile up ethnic tensions within the population. Inter-ethnic tension and political division persists between the constituent peoples of BiH: Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, and there are certain groups among these that advocate for seceding from BiH and joining with neighboring countries (most notably Serbia).
Because the constitution of BiH primarily concerns itself with its three constituent peoples, ethnic and religious minorities such as Roma and Jews are excluded from political office and often overlooked. 25 years after the war’s end, BiH still has high numbers of internally displaced peoples. Other marginalized groups face specific challenges in BiH: LGBT people face discrimination, women face high levels of gender violence and are severely underrepresented in political office, and youth may face and high levels of unemployment, violence, and radicalization risks.
Status of Police Reform and COP
Following the Bosnian war, the UN supported a broad security reform that attempted to restructure the paramilitary police forces that had served various factions in the country during the conflict. As a part of this reform, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) was created, and from 1996-2002 provided special training courses that included educational materials on COP to all police officers. From 2003-2012, the European Union Police Mission in BiH worked on reform that included COP as one of its goals. Since then, various smaller scale and more localized COP efforts have been attempted within the country and there is a larger-scale strategy on COP implementation from various police bodies with international support.
Some of the specific challenges faced by women in the police are addressed in the following digital story:
Between the Roles (Bosnia and Herzegovina) - Narrated by Katarzyna Struzinska
ICT development in BiH is similar to that of Europe at large – it is widely available, and its usage is steadily increasing, particularly among the youngest layers of the population. Although fragmentation and insufficient police cooperation makes any nationwide effort difficult to implement, a crime hotline known as Krimolovci (crime busters) introduced nationally by the European Police Mission in BiH (EUPM) is widely used to anonymously report offenses to the police. Communication between police and citizens occurs most frequently in person or through the emergency number (122), although email communication, SMS services, web forms and even applications are used in various parts of the country to administer fines and payments, deliver praise or complaints, and to report incidents.
Kosovo
Contextual Information
In the Kosovo War of 1998-1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army fought against Serbia and Montenegro in protest of the persecution of Kosovar Albanians. Following the conflict, the UN sanctioned a NATO presence in Kosovo to uphold security amidst ongoing ethnic tensions, which began to introduce COP strategies, albeit in a top-down format with little public involvement. After 2004, the UN mission began to retreat, transferring more responsibility to the Kosovo government and the Kosovo State Police. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008, it has continued to receive assistance in state-building processes from international actors, most notably from the NATO-led Kosovo Force and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).
The Kosovo state police serves as the primary security provider for Kosovars, and are involved with communities when crimes are reported, and to a lesser extent for the prevention of crimes. Common complaints of police by youth respondents included slow response times, overly complicated reporting procedures, and a lack of confidentiality for victims and those who report crimes. While there is a general lack of public trust in Kosovo’s government institutions due to perceptions of widespread corruption and nepotism, the police remain the most trusted of these institutions. The justice system, which was reformed in 2013, established new courts in smaller municipalities, to bring court houses closer to citizens. Although EULEX plays a role in this process by providing prosecutors and judges to work in collaboration with their Kosovar counterparts, corruption is relatively widespread.
A traditional justice dispute resolution mechanism known as the kanun historically operated in some rural areas, although the extent to which they still operate is unclear. The kanun are village councils consisting of elders or interconnected families, which solve local conflicts based on traditional law. Although few Kosovars are closely familiar with the kanun today, it has been incorporated into modern mediation law and may still be in use to solve disputes.
Human Security Concerns
Over the past years, crime levels have decreased in Kosovo. However, areas of North Kosovo continue to face ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians. The populations in these areas live in elevated fear of violent incidents. There is a widening degree of economic disparity that has increased as remittances from Kosovars living abroad have decreased.
For more information, see the following digital story:
There is Nothing Here (Kosovo) - Narrated by Fabienne Coenders
This has caused further emigration, with Kosovars moving to other parts of Europe in search of better opportunities. There has been a fear of Islamic radicalization in Kosovo, as an estimated 350 Kosovars joined ISIL between 2012 and 2015. Additionally, organized crime exists in the country, as Kosovo is a transit point for smuggling, money laundering, and drug and human trafficking.
Kosovo has a very young population, with over half of the population considered to be “youth”. One in five students saying they do not feel safe at schools, with violence between classmates being commonplace and physical punishment by teachers still accepted. Many youths also distrust the police, feeling that they are ineffective in addressing crime.
Minorities in Kosovo may face discrimination, particularly when looking for employment, based upon political preference, personal appearance, ethnicity, religion, and gender. While gender-based violence (GBV) is not widely reported, this is largely suspected to result from a lack of awareness of GBV being a crime. Cultural factors within Kosovo emphasize patriarchal structures and the financial dependence of women, which can lead to women being vulnerable.
Status of Police Reform and COP
As a former Yugoslav state, Kosovo is familiar with some elements of community policing. Between the 60’s and 80’s, police were decentralized, and frequent police patrols contributed to broad knowledge of community security. In post-war Kosovo, COP was (re-)introduced as part of security reform. The reform has focused upon improving police training and organizational transformation, problem-solving orientation in police practices, and evaluations of strategies. Municipal Community Safety Councils were established in 2009 to address community security by including the mayor, police, religious and ethnic communities, and civil society (including minorities) in discussion – however, there may be low awareness of these initiatives. Finally, the KP have attempted some outreach catered towards youth including summer camps and traffic safety presentations, and the international community remains engaged to assisting COP initiatives, especially through Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX).
There is a high level of mobile tech use among youth in Kosovo, and to a limited extent this has been incorporated into COP initiatives to facilitate police-community communication. This includes smartphones applications, like Girls Coding Kosova (which was developed by an NGO to address GBV and sexual harassment by providing a panic button that alerts police). In schools, records systems like the Educational Data Management System allow for teachers and police to collaborate to prevent school violence, and additional measures such as cameras and guards have been installed to provide increased security. Outside of urban areas, however, access to computers and internet connectivity limits the incorporation of ICT into policing.
Serbia
Contextual Information
Serbia emerged as a republic following the dissolution of Yugoslavia during the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990’s. Following this period, Serbia went through an economic crisis, amidst ongoing ethnic tensions and the 10-year regime of Slobodan Miloševic. It underwent further fragmentation as the union with Montenegro was dissolved in 2006, and in 2008 when Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. In 2014, Serbia started accession negotiations with the European Union.
The police in Serbia are organized under the Ministry of Interior. In general, the police are associated with corruption, and for serving the state rather than its citizens. Since 2001, a variety of international actors have supported Serbian security reform, most notably the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – Mission to Serbia, which has released several strategic COP documents.
Human Security Concerns
Petty crimes such as aggravated theft, robbery, and vehicle theft are decreasing in Serbia, but organized crime remains a concern. Serbia is on the main route for narcotic transport and other smuggling and trafficking operations from Eastern Europe, and gangs may often perpetuate violence using firearms and explosives during feuds. Corruption, unemployment, poverty and domestic violence are also primary insecurity concerns.
Youth are one of the groups that are particularly vulnerable in Serbia, as they are both victims of violence as well as the group most frequently accused of committing crimes. The LGBT community faces discrimination and hate crimes, and human rights activists who stand up for these groups have also been threatened. Ethnic minorities, particularly the Roma community, also face discrimination. In recent years, some police have encouraged Roma to join them to improve representation, and other programs aim at promoting the social inclusion of Roma.
Women in Serbia face high levels of domestic violence. State efforts to address this include laws that remove violent perpetrators from families and improved record-keeping of violent offenses. As a result, domestic violence has decreased alongside an increase in public awareness, and Serbia has risen in the Gender Equality Index.
Status of Police Reform and COP
Serbia experienced something akin to community policing due to the Yugoslav concept of “social self-protection” in policing. This consisted of decentralized police forces that patrolled regularly, leading to broad police knowledge of local communities. However, during the 1990 wars, the police protected the regime, resulting in a more repressive form of policing. Serbia has since received help from various international agencies as part of security reform processes. This included the promotion of COP programs and initiatives, with OSCE being the main actor, but with other projects in areas of Serbia aided by the UK, Switzerland, Norway, Canada and Sweden.
As a result, a manual on COP was published in Serbia that included an overview of COP definitions, concepts and terminology, and in 2018 a 5-year strategic police plan that included COP efforts was released by the Ministry of Interior. However, government COP efforts have failed to engage the local population. Nevertheless, Serbia has seen positive developments. For instance, Local Security Councils (LSCs) have been established with help from OSCE and the Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities. LSCs unite representatives from local authorities, the education sector, NGOs and the police to identify local community problems and increase public awareness of mitigation efforts. Police also perform other types of outreach, such as visiting schools and creating awareness about domestic violence.
Despite low adoption of ICT for COP purposes, relatively low public internet use, and low values of e-government-related indicators, there are efforts to incorporate communication technology into security provision. Multiple hotlines provided by both the state and NGO’s exist to report cases of domestic violence against women and children, and some web applications have been developed by NGOs to verify levels of COP implementation within communities.