Five years into Taliban rule, Afghanistan is no longer at war, but it is far from at peace.
August 15, 2026, marked the Taliban movement's fifth year in power in Kabul.
The immediate shock of the regime change has faded, but the country's underlying crises have become increasingly entrenched.
While the Taliban Authorities have largely ended the nationwide conflict that defined the previous two decades, peace has not translated into prosperity, inclusion, or stability. Instead, Afghanistan has settled into a fragile equilibrium marked by political isolation, humanitarian dependence, regional tensions, and the systematic exclusion of half its population.
This has been further exacerbated by climate change impacts and increased regional insecurity. Understanding what comes next means being honest about both halves of that record and the narrow paths forward.
The international community now faces a difficult question: how to maintain engagement with Afghanistan without legitimising policies that fundamentally violate human rights.
Without a coherent long-term strategy, Afghanistan risks becoming a permanently marginalised state whose instability increasingly impacts the wider region.
Main challenges
The systematic erasure of women and girls from public life
The first and most profound challenge remains the erasure of women and girls from public life. Afghanistan is the only country in the world where girls are prohibited from attending secondary school, while women remain excluded from universities and vocational training, numerous professions, and much of public life through restrictions placed on their mobility. These restrictions are not simply violations of individual rights; they represent a deliberate dismantling of the country's human capital.
The long-term consequences extend well beyond gender equality. An economy cannot sustainably develop while excluding half its workforce.
Health systems struggle without female doctors, nurses, and midwives.
Education systems deteriorate without women teachers. Future generations inherit lower levels of literacy, productivity, and social mobility.
Every year these policies remain in place, Afghanistan loses skills, economic capacity, and institutional resilience that will take decades to rebuild.
Escalating insecurity along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has halted trade and debilitated humanitarian operations
Relations with Pakistan have deteriorated dramatically, driven largely by disagreements over the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but also by other sources of cross-border militancy and the stop-start discussions and disputes over the Durand Line. Pakistan continues to pressure the Taliban Authorities to prevent militant groups from being based or operating from their territory, and decision-makers in Kabul and Kandahar have resisted taking the measures Islamabad demands.
The resulting cycle of border closures, military strikes and exchanges, and diplomatic breakdowns has implications far beyond bilateral relations. Pakistan remains Afghanistan's most important trade corridor, and instability along the border disrupts commerce, humanitarian operations, and regional connectivity.
Continued escalation also risks creating a wider regional security crisis that neither government appears capable of managing alone, but this has fallen into the shadow of the conflict in neighbouring Iran.
Declining global attention combined with reduced humanitarian funding
Afghanistan remains one of the world's largest humanitarian emergencies, compounded by a series of natural disasters and a wave of forced returns from Iran and Pakistan, increasing the population by 12%.
This has created immense demands on an economy that has yet to recover from the loss of international financing.
With the closure of USAID and a greater global shift in defence spending, the funds available to respond have significantly diminished. This translates directly into closed health clinics, reduced nutrition programmes, diminished education services, and fewer opportunities for communities to recover from repeated shocks.
Humanitarian agencies have demonstrated that they can continue operating despite political constraints, but they cannot replace sustained financial commitments from donor governments.
A lack of coherent international engagement
Since late 2021, international engagement has focused overwhelmingly on humanitarian relief, with development financing rarely discussed. This distinction is understandable politically but problematic economically, creating a culture of dependency and economic stagnation.
The lack of a long-term framework also creates uncertainty for Afghan businesses, civil society organisations, and international partners. Without predictable investment or development planning, economic recovery remains elusive regardless of humanitarian assistance levels.
But Afghanistan's isolation is gradually eroding. With official recognition from Russia, China has established a significant economic relationship, which is being followed by a growing circle of regional partners such as Turkey, India, Iran, and the Central Asian republics, with Uzbekistan rapidly becoming a major trading partner.
Meanwhile, European countries remain fragmented in their approach, ranging from a desire to retain dialogue to outright deals on deporting Afghan immigrants. The negotiation process for such arrangements is perceived by the Taliban Authorities as one step closer to legitimacy and recognition.
Ways forward
Protect humanitarian activities and certain and development opportunities from being combined with diplomatic recognition
Channelling assistance through independent humanitarian channels such as the UN system and NGOs has been the main entry point since 2021. But with assistance funding cuts and declining political attention on Afghanistan, allowing essential services to collapse would primarily harm ordinary Afghans rather than alter Taliban policies.
Shifting from ‘Humanitarian Plus’ toward carefully designed development engagement
Selective and ring-fenced investments in agriculture, healthcare, water management, renewable energy, education, and local livelihoods can strengthen resilience without necessarily conferring political legitimacy. Medium-term development should be viewed as a means of reducing long-term dependence rather than rewarding governments.
Provide coherent support for Afghan civil society still operating within the country
While defining "localisation" remains an ongoing topic, almost all of these local civil society organisations (CSOs) will never meet the rigorous requirements for direct funding, but they remain remnants of the social infrastructure that can be drawn upon.
More work needs to be done to develop an umbrella mechanism, perhaps run by "credible" NGOs, that provides the required risk management for donors while providing financing and support to these local CSOs.
Greater strategic coherence on regional diplomacy and international engagement around Afghanistan
Neighbouring countries share common interests in preventing terrorism, managing migration, expanding trade, and maintaining border stability. A sustained regional dialogue involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asian republics, China, India, and key Gulf partners could help reduce the risk of repeated bilateral crises escalating into broader conflicts.
On the international front, rather than oscillating between disengagement and crisis response, governments should articulate a realistic long-term policy that combines humanitarian support, selective development assistance, regional diplomacy, accountability for human rights violations, and continued engagement with Afghan civil society. Such an approach acknowledges both the political realities on the ground and the enduring needs of the Afghan people.
Clearly, a choice has to be made between reactive crisis management and a patient, principled strategy that prioritises the long-term well-being of Afghanistan's people. Without such a strategy, Afghanistan risks remaining trapped in a cycle of humanitarian dependence, geopolitical competition, and lost opportunity for years to come.
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Karim Merchant teaches the course Statebuilding and Conflict in Fragile and Conflict Affected States on the International Relations master's programme at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences.