Interactions between closely-held firms and their owners

Much of the economic literature draws a distinction between firm and individual. In that view, a corporation acts either to maximize profits or objectives of managers. Once one turns to tax incentives, the behavior of a corporation responds to corporate tax incentives and may only respond to individual tax incentives in general or, more subtly when clientele effects are taken into account, those of an average owner. Most firms though do not fit this framework: for corporations with few owners, there is usually no separation of management and control and a specific individual owner's circumstances may shape the behavior of the corporation The majority of corporations are small and medium sized, and they are often owner-managed. For such corporations, the owner decides on firm behavior in order to maximize his private level utility, which implies that these firms may respond differently to tax incentives than large, listed corporations. The majority of mpirical research on firms' tax behavior is conducted on large, listed corporations with separation between ownership and management.

The main goal of this project is bringing businesses and individuals together and investigating how the ties between individuals and firms could potentially affect behavioral responses to taxes.