
# Rural-urban Youth Migration and Informal Self-Employment in Ethiopia

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Norwegian University of Life Sciences Centre for Land Tenure Studies

Centre for Land Tenure Studies Report



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# **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

CSA Central Statistical Agency

ETUMS Ethiopian Urban Migration Study Survey FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

GLTN Global Land Tool Network

ICPS Inter Censual Survey
IV Instrumental Variable

SNNP Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples region

SSCV Shoe Shining and Coffee Vending activities

UN United Nations

# Acknowledgments

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# **Summary**

Rural-urban migration has been historically low in Ethiopia. But recent years have seen a surge in all parts of Ethiopia. This is partly related to access to agricultural land in rural areas. Access to farm land is a constitutional right to village residents of Ethiopia, but it has become difficult to fulfill this right for the young generation because of increasing land scarcity. At the same time, the rapid expansion of urban centers with better education, technology and other basic social services attract youth to towns and cities in search for better livelihoods. Empirical studies in the migration literature indicate that migration is often welfare improving for the migrant. But it is also possible that youth migrants become more susceptible and less competitive in urban areas because of lower endowment in education, experience, financial capital and social network. This report examines the experience of youth migrants, their challenges and opportunities using three sets of data that enable a mapping of youth migration from rural villages to the urban centers in Ethiopia. The data we used in this study include; 1) household level data from southern Ethiopia, collected from surveys in 2007 and 2013 (about 600 households); 2) data from a survey of tracked youth who have migrated from southern Ethiopia in the period 2007-2013 (75 youth); and 3) data from a survey of youth who are engaged in informal self-employment in two urban centers - Addis Ababa and Hawassa (445 youth). We used both qualitative and quantitative analysis, including econometric methods.

We found significant rural-urban migration in Ethiopia. One-third of the households in our sample have at least one member that has migrated to urban areas in the six years since 2007, and 21% have at least one youth member who has migrated to urban areas. Youth migrate for various reasons, but the predominant factor is better livelihood. We found that youth from poorer households and from villages with less agricultural potential are more likely to migrate. We also found that youth who expect better employment in urban areas such as youth with more education are more likely to migrate. Most youth migrate with the consent of their parents, who in most cases cover the costs of their migration. We found that having contacts in the destination city is very helpful and make migration less expensive. We see no evidence of conflicts and tension between migrant youth and local communities. The majority of migrants leave their village with reasonable expectation about life in urban areas and they are now generally satisfied with their life.

The data indicate that informal self-employment attract youth migrants, mainly because it has relatively less resource requirement than other activities. Almost all of the randomly selected youth engaged in informal self-employment in Addis Ababa and Hawassa were migrants. We learn that there is heterogeneity in income and tenure security among youth engaged in street based self-employment. Those who have a work station among a sizable cluster earn better and have more tacit recognition and security than youth who are mobile or work in small clusters, although all are informal. Most of the youth in street-based self-employment aspire to move out of that occupation. The majority of these youth indicate that they have started taking concrete steps to achieve their objective of transiting to a better occupation.

Migrant youth face several constraints in urban areas. Tenure insecurity, in terms of rental arrangements in residential units as well as work place insecurity from eviction and confiscation, seems to be very important problems. The majority of the youth migrants are also vulnerable and food insecure since they do not have the social network that can provide them with informal safety net during crisis. Young women seem to be more disadvantaged than male youth. They earn less both in the formal employment, as reported from tracked youth, and in the informal self-employment. In addition, there is also a higher risk that young women are trapped in the low resource, low-income state since they are less endowed with resources. Our analysis of the decision to transit out of informal self-employment also shows that young men are more likely to aspire for a better occupation than young women. Education seems to have stronger positive impact on the motivation and determination of young women to transit to a better occupation.

#### 1 Introduction

Rural-urban migration has been historically low in Ethiopia. But recent years have seen a surge in migration in all parts of Ethiopia. Although access to farm land is a constitutional right to village residents of Ethiopia, it has become difficult to fulfill this right for the young generation because of increasing land scarcity. This is particularly true for the highlands of Ethiopia where population densities have become very high. A recent study on rural youth livelihoods shows that the increase in farmland scarcity in the highlands of Ethiopia coupled with lack of non-farm employment opportunities in the rural areas have pushed youth away from their agricultural livelihoods and rural villages (Bezu & Holden, 2014). On the other hand, the rapid expansion of urban centers with better education, technology, and other basic social services, attracts youth to towns and cities in search for better livelihoods. While youth migrants from rural areas might have escaped the land tenure insecurity that compromised their livelihood opportunity in rural areas, they may face different kinds of tenure insecurity and livelihood challenges in urban areas.

This study examines youth rural-urban migration in Ethiopia. Recent years have produced some studies on internal migration in Ethiopia, particularly focusing on remittances (De Brauw & Mueller, 2012; de Brauw, Mueller, & Woldehanna, 2012; Moller, 2012). However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no research on youth migration and the challenges young people face during and after migration. This research intends to contribute to fill this gap by carrying out an in-depth study of the youth migration from Southern Ethiopia. In line with Ethiopia's National Youth Policy (FDRE, 2004), we define youth as those individuals in the age group 15-29. We use a combination of household data and individual data to study the challenges and opportunities youth face during and after the migration including the housing and employment challenges. The household data cover a sample of 620 households from Oromia and SNNP regions of Ethiopia in the South. Selected districts in the SNNP region of Ethiopia are the most densely populated and have the smallest farm sizes while the Oromia region, including the zones we have studied before, have relatively larger farm sizes. We also use two types of individual migrant data. One is a sample of 75 youth who have migrated from the villages in our household survey and have been tracked and interviewed in their current urban residence. The second set of individual data is from a survey of migrant youth who are engaged in informal self-employment

in the city of Addis Ababa and Hawassa town. This individual level data cover a sample of 445 youth.

Section 2 of the report provides some broader information about urbanization and migration in Ethiopia. Section 3 briefly reviews some of the theories and empirical literature on migration, followed by the description of data and methods in section 4. Section 5 presents information on the scale and type of outmigration from Southern Ethiopia and Section 6 explores migration experience of youth based on tracked youth who have migrated from rural areas of Southern Ethiopia. Section 7 presents a detailed analysis of employment condition and aspiration of youth engaged in informal self-employment based on a broader sample of self-employed youth in Addis Ababa and Hawassa. Section 8 summarizes the findings of the paper while Section 9 provides concluding remarks and recommendations.

# 2 Urbanization and rural-urban migration in Ethiopia

# 2.1 Urbanization in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is one of the least urbanized countries in the world, even by the standard of Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the most recent population census in Ethiopia, only 16% of Ethiopia's population lives in urban areas (CSA, 2008) while the average for Sub-Saharan Africa was 34% (UN, 2014). Other Eastern African countries also experienced higher urbanization than Ethiopia although they have started with similar low level of urban population at the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Figure 1). According to the census carried out by the national statistical agency of Ethiopia, the urban population share in Ethiopia increased only by 2% in 23 years; from 14% in 1984 (which is the first census year) to 16% in 2007 <sup>1</sup> (CSA, 2008).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Only three censuses have been carried out in Ethiopia: These are the 1984, 1994 and 2007 censuses.




Figure 1 Comparison of Ethiopia's urbanization with other regions of Africa

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision (UN, 2012)

This is not to say that the urban population have not increased much in the last few decades. In fact, in the period 1984 and 2013, the largest five cities in Ethiopia enjoyed 120 - 365% increase in the population size (Brinkhof, 2014), but the majority of Ethiopians still live in rural areas where reproductive fertility is higher.

But this is about to change. Ethiopia's urban population share is projected to grow much more rapidly, doubling from the 2007 rate of 16% of the population to 32% by 2045. In the coming few decades, Ethiopia's urban population growth is projected to be among the highest in the world (Figure 2).




Figure 2 Average annual rate of change in percentage of urban population

Data Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision (UN, 2012)

# 2.2 Rural-urban migration in Ethiopia

#### 2.2.1 Early rural-urban migration

Because Ethiopia doesn't have detailed and up-to-date population registration and had no census before 1984, it is difficult to have a clear picture of early rural-urban migration in the country. The extent of migration is thus only deducted from observed economic, social and policy changes. Pankhurst et al. (2013) observe that the establishment of mechanized and irrigated farms in the imperial regime in the 1950s encouraged significant migration of laborers and peasants as well as establishment of towns. Different views have been raised regarding how the policies of the socialist Derg regime, that came into power in 1974 influenced this trend. On the one hand, some argue that the land reforms in rural areas effectively tied the peasants to their lands while restrictions on labor movement and requirement of registration in urban areas further discouraged migration to urban areas (Pankhurst et al., 2013; Rahmato, 1984). On the other hand, the villagization program is claimed to have pushed disgruntled farmers to urban areas while the proliferation of government offices and agencies increased the importance of urban

centers and their attraction for migrants (Berhanu & White, 2000). Other push factors such as population pressure, frequent draught and famine are also likely to drive temporary and permanent rural-urban migration. Still, the overall low level of urbanization compared to other African countries may indicate that the land policy has been effective in keeping people on the land.

#### 2.2.2 Current level of migration and recent trend

This sub-section heavily draws from two reports that include the most recent data on migration. The first one is the 2013 "Report of the Inter Censal Population Survey (ICPS)" by the Central Statistical Agency (CSA, 2013). This report provides important population statistics, including migration, based on a survey of more than two hundred thousand households across all regions in Ethiopia. Information about one million people was collected through this survey in 2012. Although the survey includes samples from all regions, the majority of the sample is from Amhara and Addis Ababa, which were the primary targets of the survey<sup>2</sup>. Another source of migration statistics is the World Bank report from "The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study Survey (ETUMS)". The 2008 survey covers a sample of 1115 households and 6085 household members in Addis Ababa and provides important information on the socio-economic status of migrants, their decision to migrate, and their migration experience (see Moller, 2012 for details).

The ICPS data shows that 49% of the current urban population in Ethiopia are first generation migrants. A closer examination of the migration stream shows that, among all migrants in Ethiopia, rural to rural migrants account for 37% while rural to urban migrants account for 33%. The rest are migrants between urban areas (19%) and those who migrate from urban to rural areas (11%). This indicates that historically there have been more movement of people within rural areas than between rural and urban areas or within urban areas. But the shift in recent years towards more rural-urban migration is also very clear from the data. Among recent migrants (those who migrated in the last five years before the survey), rural to urban migrants account for 39% while the rural to rural migrants account for only 27%. Addis Ababa is the most favored destination for migrants, attracting 43% of all migrants originating from different parts of the

reasonable precision for the two regions of Amhara and Addis Ababa and the demographic indicators for all Regions" (see CSA, 2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> According to the report, the survey "had the twin objectives of getting the estimate of the total population with

country (CSA, 2013). This is reflected by the proportion of Addis Ababa residents who are migrants. The statistics from the Ethiopian Urban Migration Study Survey (ETUMS) shows that 37% of Addis Ababa's residents were migrants and more than half of these migrants came from rural areas (Moller, 2012).

There are more female migrants than male migrants in Ethiopia. The share of migrants among the female population is 50% for urban dwellers and 9.3% among rural dwellers while the rates for the male population are 46% in the urban areas and 7.8% in the rural areas (CSA, 2013). This may be partly related to the virilocal marriage system practiced in most parts of Ethiopia which entails a relocation of women to the village of their husband at the time of marriage. But, of course, there are also other factors that drive the larger female migration, especially to urban areas where the virilocal system is of less importance. In Addis Ababa, 63% of the recent migrants are female while among the non-migrant city population the male to female ratio is equal. Only 4% of these recent migrants report marriage arrangement as their reason for migrating to the city (Moller, 2012).

According to the ICPS data, youth are the most mobile section of the society. Youth migrants account for 60% of the recent migrants (CSA, 2013). But the report does not show migration disaggregated by source and destination for each group. However, the migration to Addis Ababa, according to the ETUMS study, provides suggestive evidence that youth have higher rural-urban migration rate than other age groups. The migrants in the age group 15-35 account for 51% of recent migrants while migrants in the next age group (35-55) account for only 24% of recent migrants.

# 3 Literature review: Theories of migration and empirical evidence

# 3.1 Determinants of rural-urban migration

Early theoretical discussions on rural-urban migration in economics focus on the individual's motivation to migrate from rural to urban areas. It is argued that differences in returns and income between rural and urban areas are the main drivers of rural-urban migration (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954; Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969). In the highly influential Harris-Todaro model, wages in urban areas are institutionally set above market clearing price so that

migrants compare the expected wage in the urban sector with the agricultural wage in the rural areas. Hence, rural-urban migration will exist even if there is unemployment in urban areas so long as *expected earning* in urban areas is higher than earnings in rural areas (Harris & Todaro, 1970). Later models of migration incorporate more factors than the wage differential as a trigger for migration and more actors than the migrants in the decision making. In the 'new economics of migration' the household is the unit of analysis instead of the individual migrant and factors such as risk minimization, imperfections in rural markets and relative deprivation are considered important incentives for migration in addition to differences in expected returns to labor (Azam & Gubert, 2006; Katz & Stark, 1986; Stark, 1991; Stark & Bloom, 1985; Taylor, 1999)<sup>3</sup>.

The migration theories imply that more people will migrate from poor areas that have relatively low return to labor and more exposure to risks and shocks. However, the empirical evidence shows that it is not always the case. Some empirical literature documents segmentation of migration streams but the poorest areas do not always have the most out-migration (De Haan, 1999). Migration is self-perpetuating in the sense that migrants from a certain area open the way for more migrants from the same place through their social capital that reduces the cost and risk of new migrants and increases the return from migration (Massey, 1988). It is not always the case that the migrants are individuals who are expected to earn better in urban areas. This is because barriers in the form of lack of capital to finance migration, absence of networks, insufficient information, distance to urban areas and poor infrastructures limit migration for those facing the constraints. It has been argued that high cost of migration reduces the prospect of migration and the benefits from it for the rural poor (Lipton, 1980). In addition, policies and regulations that limit the movement of people, such as the 'hukou' system in China (Chan & Zhang, 1999), and local culture also influence migration outcomes. These factors are not independent and sometimes interact or overlap to reinforce the impact. For example, Azam and Gubert (2006) show how the interaction of culture and network result in quite different levels of migration for households belonging to different ethnic groups but living in the same geographic area. The implication of existence of constraints to migration is that rural development in areas

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> There are other diverse theories of migration from other disciplines including from sociology, political economy and geography. Like the neo-classical and new economics of migration, these alternative theories also influence the empirical literature as well as policies (for further discussion see De Haan, 1999; De Haas, 2010; Ghatak, Levine, & Price, 1996; Massey et al., 1993).

of origin may actually result in increase in migration as development relaxes the constraints, especially if it increases human capital and access to cities (De Haan, 1999; Rhoda, 1983).

# 3.2 Profile of rural-urban migrants

Migrants do not represent a random sample of the overall population (Michael Todaro, 1980). The human capital theory suggests that those who migrate have higher skills and higher probability of getting employed than non-migrants; they also have higher expected income over time in the urban sector than in the rural areas (Sjaastad, 1962; Michael Todaro, 1980). Empirical studies found results consistent with the theory. Most labor migrants in poor countries are young, mostly in the age group 15-30 (De Haan, 1999; Lipton, 1980). They are also more educated than others indicating the self-selectivity of the migrants (Agesa, 2001; Hoddinott, 1994). In terms of gender, males dominate labor migration in Africa and Asia (Connell, Dasgupta, Laishley, & Lipton, 1976). The costs associated with migration, including the financial costs, risks associated with migration and lack of information create barriers to migration for individuals who can potentially benefit from migration. For example, in western Kenya, Hoddinott (1994) shows that while the amount of land received from parents reduces the likelihood of sons' migration because it indicates the earning potential in the rural area, parental land holding, proxying wealth and ability to finance migration, and thus increases the likelihood of sons' migration. Other factors related to household welfare maximization decisions are also likely to be reflected in migration decisions since migration decisions are not always only about the migrant's relative return (Taylor, 1999).

# 3.3 Magnitude of rural-urban migration

While only 30% of people in the world lived in urban areas in 1950, currently more than half of the world population (53%) lives in urban areas; and this is expected to increase to 64% by 2050 (UN, 2014). The region with the largest rate of urbanization in recent years is Asia, particularly Eastern and South Eastern Asia, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2005-2010, the growth rate of the urban population share is reported to be 1.69 % in Asia and 1.41% in Sub-Saharan Africa, against the world average of 0.9% (UN, 2014). Specific data on the magnitude of rural-urban

migration globally and nationally is typically missing<sup>4</sup> but it is reasonable to assume that rural-urban migration must have significantly contributed to this growth. The few evidences on internal migration show high levels of population movement within countries. There are 200 million internal migrants in India and 120 million in China (Mendola, 2012). A study that disaggregates the components of urban population growth for Chinese cities in the years 1978-1999 shows that 75% of the urban growth in that period is attributed to rural-urban migration (Zhang & Song, 2003).

#### 3.4 Migrants and the informal sector

The Harris-Tordaro (HT) model and the other subsequent migration theories, with various modifications incorporate unemployment in their model and assume that migrants from rural areas factor-in the probability of unemployment in their decision to migrate to urban areas. Whether and how long they will be unemployed, and whether migrants are more likely to be unemployed than urban natives is an empirical question. Another dimension that has been later introduced in the urban labor market is the informal sector. It has been argued that migrants engage in informal employment until the time they are able to find formal employment in the urban sector. The informal sector is typically assumed to have lower returns than the formal sector but it gives additional options than going back to agriculture, and serves as a stepping stone to formal urban employment (Fields, 1975). The empirical question is then whether the informal sector in fact serves as an entry point for new migrants in urban areas. There are evidences that confirm that returns in the informal sector are on average lower than that of the formal sector but there was no solid evidence that collaborate the argument that the informal sector is used as a stepping stone to the formal employment by new migrants (Banerjee, 1983; Démurger, Gurgand, Li, & Yue, 2009; Mazumdar, 1976; Meng & Zhang, 2001). In India, for example, it was shown that more than half of the migrants who entered the informal sector did not seek to move to the formal sector (Banerjee, 1983), suggesting that at least some of the individuals engaged in informal activity do so by choice. Recently, the theoretical and empirical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The total stock of international migrants worldwide is estimated to be 232 million persons in 2013 (UNDESA, 2013). Since internal migration is estimated to be much larger than international migration, this number is suggestive of the magnitude of internal migration, including rural-urban.

literature recognized heterogeneity in the informal sector with some upper tier activities yielding better return than formal wage employment which makes it attractive employment in its own right instead of serving as a temporary stage for those who cannot move to the formal sector(Günther & Launov, 2012; William F Maloney, 1999). In Mexico, Maloney (2004) shows that 60% of men in self-employment left their previous employment to join the informal sector voluntarily. He argues that the poverty observed in the informal sector in developing countries has more to do with low level of human capital than with formality or informality of employment (Maloney, 2004).

#### 4 Data and methods

There are three surveys that produce the data for this analysis: 1) the household surveys from 2007 and 2013; 2) survey of tracked youth migrants; and 3) survey of youth engaged in Shoeshining and Street Coffee Vending (SSCV) in Addis Ababa and Hawassa. Each of the surveys and the sample in each survey are described below.

- 1. Household survey in 2007 and 2013: The household data from these surveys are used as a basis for computing the magnitude of migration from rural areas in southern Ethiopia. The sample covers 620 households drawn from 16 villages spread over three districts in Oromia region (in West Arsi zone) and two districts in the Sidama and Wollaita zones in the region of Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP). Demographic data collected in 2007 and 2013 provide information on which of the household members migrated in the period between the surveys. Detailed description of the sampling and the survey areas is provided in Bezu and Holden (2014a). This data is used to examine the extent of migration from villages in southern Ethiopia and analyze factors associated with youth migration outcome.
- 2. **Survey of tracked youth migrants**: In this survey, we tracked and interviewed 75 youth who belonged to households in the 2007 but migrated by 2013. Our target was to track 151 youth who belong to our 2007 sample households but migrated sometime in the 2007 2013 period. The target 151 sample youth did not include youth who have migrated due to marriage. We started the tracking in September-October 2013 by contacting the household heads or other knowledgeable members of the households from the migrants' family. We

administer a very brief questionnaire to obtain information about the current addresses and other related information about the migrants. We then used the addresses to locate the migrants. The single most important contact information is the phone number of the migrant or the phone number of the migrant's friends and relatives in the urban area. Most often parents know the city where the migrant lives and in some cases they know his or her neighbourhood. But without phone number, locating a migrant using physical address is very difficult, especially in Addis Ababa.<sup>5</sup> We were able to trace 50% of the youth in one month<sup>6</sup>. Unsuccessful traces are often because some parents have either incomplete or outdated information about their children's specific addresses<sup>7</sup>. It appears that parents do not expect to visit their children in the city until they are well established. Most often, contacts between the recent migrant and the household members in the village happened in the form of a visit or a phone call from the migrant (96% of recent contact in our sample). We use this data to examine in detail the migration experience of youth during the migration process in the early days of migration and after they have settled in their current location. In addition this data is used to explore shelter and housing issues for the youth.

3. Survey of youth engaged in Shoe shining and Street Coffee Vending (SSCV) in Addis Ababa and Hawassa: The migration literature suggests that urban migrants, who are attracted to cities and towns due to higher wage in the formal sector, may end up in a low-paying informal sector, since there is more labor supply to the 'modern sector' than there is labor demand to absorb it all. We thus try to examine youth involvement in the informal sector using a sample of youth who are engaged in street-based self-employment. During a preliminary survey that we conducted prior to the field survey for this study, we learned that

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> When phone numbers are not available, neighbourhood information are not of much use unless the migrant lives or works in or near a well-known building in that neighbourhood. This is especially a serious problem in Addis Ababa where the population density is very high. Ethiopian cities have not yet established a system of street and house numbering that could be used to uniquely identify buildings and houses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> It is reasonable to assume that if we have dedicated more time than the one month that we used for locating youth migrants, we might have had a higher rate of success. We do not expect the likelihood of being tracked to be random. It is obvious that the youth we were able to locate have better and perhaps more frequent and close contact with their relatives than the ones we were unable to locate due to incomplete and outdated contact address.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> 30% of the parents/relatives in the village did not know the phone number of the migrant or the phone number of his/her contact in the city. In addition, for some migrants, the relatives in the village had incorrect or out of use phone number. There were also cases where the migrant lives in a different city than reported by parents/relatives two months earlier.

shoe-shining and coffee-vending (SSCV) is one of the informal activities that attract youth migrants due to its limited financial, educational and social capital requirements. The survey was carried out in December 2013 and January 2014 in the town of Hawassa and Addis Ababa city. This data is used mainly to analyze youth migrants' experience in the informal self-employment sector including the challenges they face in improving their occupation and livelihood situation.

Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia and by far the largest city in the country. With a population estimate of 3.1 million people, it is 11 times larger than the second largest city, Mekele (see CSA, 2012). In Addis Ababa, we draw the sample for the survey using a stratified random sampling technique because of the size of the city and the corresponding spread of SSCV across several city centers and streets<sup>8</sup>. The sample contains 149 youth. We use the administrative division of Addis Ababa into 10 sub-cities as the basis and randomly select two neighborhoods from each sub-city. Youth engaged in SSCV often have a recognized and *de facto* reserved area for their business. These are often located around bus and taxi stations as well as near shopping areas, cafes, restaurants and service-providing public institutions. Enumerators were instructed to survey all SSCV clusters in the sample neighborhoods<sup>9</sup>.

The rapidly growing town of Hawassa is the capital of SNNP region as well as Sidama zone<sup>10</sup>. It has a population size of 213,000 people (CSA, 2012) and grew three fold since the 1994 census (CSA, 1996). It has recently attracted migrants from the surrounding towns and villages, although to a much lower extent than Addis Ababa. The Hawassa sample contains all youth engaged in SSCV that are stationed or work along the main streets of Hawassa<sup>11</sup>. This sample contains 296 individuals. We took a larger sample from Hawassa than Addis Ababa for logistical reasons.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> We have however took a census of shoe-shiners in Addis Ababa by simply counting their number and registering their location using GPS equipment to show the distribution in the map (see **appendix**)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> From the pilot survey we learned that while children younger than 15 engaged in SSCV activities, it is not very common to find adults older than 30 engaged in these activities. Hence in Hawassa as well as Addis Ababa, we exclude from sample only children younger than 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> There are 13 zones in SNNP. Each zone has its own town where the administrative offices are based. Hawassa serves as the capital of the region as well as Sidama zone.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Shoe shiners and street vendors set up their station in busy city streets where there are other businesses or office buildings to bring enough pedestrians.

With these three levels of surveys, we obtain rich sets of data that supplement each other and allow for analysis of youth migration experience from the rural villages to the inner city. The informal survey we mentioned earlier reveals that most youth engaged in SSCV in Addis Ababa are from southern Ethiopia. The selection of SSCV to study informal self-employment of youth migrants was thus an ideal choice.

# 5 Out-Migration in Southern Ethiopia

This section discusses the magnitude of out-migration from southern Ethiopia based on household surveys in 2007 and 2013. Roster data from 2007<sup>12</sup> and 2013, and additional questions about migrant members in 2013 reveal important information on the level of migration in the sample districts in SNNP and Oromia regions.

# 5.1 Magnitude

Of the more than 4600 individuals registered in the 2007 survey, 653 (14%) have left their respective households and villages of residence by 2013. One-third of the migrants left their village for another rural area. The majority migrated to urban areas where better income, education and livelihood might be expected. International migration accounts for less than 5% (Table 1).

Table 1 Migration from southern Ethiopia by destination

Migrant Destination	Freq.	Percent
International	2	3 3.5
Addis Ababa	6	8 10.4
Hawassa	7	9 12.1
Wollaita Sodo	4	2 6.4
Other cities and towns	22	1 33.8
Other rural areas	22	0 33.7
Total	65	3 100

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> We found (when we ask when the member registered in 2007 left) that some of the members that were reported as residents in 2007 were not physically present at that time perhaps because they were thought to have left temporarily or that they were students. For the purpose of out-migration we take the households' reports as there was no doubt that they were members who have migrated (although they might have migrated a bit earlier than 2007).

There is variation across the survey sites in the rate of migration. The most migration is observed for Wollaita where 20% of all residents from the 2007 sample migrated by 2013. The least migration is observed for Sidama where only 6% migrated in the 2007-2013 period. Rural-urban migration is higher than rural to rural migration except in Shashemene district (Table 2).

Table 2 Migration disaggregated by district

		Rural-	All	
	Rural-Rural	Urban	migration	N (sample)
Shashemene	7.1	3.1	10.5	1,071
Arsi Negelle	6.3	7.6	14.9	1,151
Wondo Genet	1.6	4.5	6.7	960
Wollaita	3.8	16.8	20.7	1,472
Total	4.7	8.8	14.0	4,654

Source: Own survey data.

Table 3 summarizes the purpose of migration<sup>13</sup>. The most common reason for migrating to urban areas is to look for a job or take up an offer of employment. Migrants with these motives account for 56% of all urban migrants. On the other hand, the most common reason for migrating to a rural area is marriage. While 80% of rural migrants move to another village due to marriage, less than 10% of the migration was employment-related. On the other hand, migration due to marriage accounts for only 15% of rural to urban migration. The majority of the urban migrants from Wollaita (66%) migrate for employment purposes as are migrants from Sidama (52%) but the number of urban migrants from Sidama is much smaller (Table 3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> As the migrant has already left the village, the reason for migration is reported by the household head or another remaining member who is knowledgeable about the avowed purpose of the migrant. The reasons for migration differ by destination.

Table 3 Purpose of migration as reported by relatives of migrants

	urban	rural
Purpose of migration	%	%
Marriage related	15.3	79.7
To study/school convenience	20.8	4.6
Job and employment related	56.1	7.8
To live with relatives	4.8	6.0
Others	3.0	1.8
Number of Obs.	399	217

Table 4 Purpose of migration to urban areas disaggregated by source area

		Wondo				
Purpose of migration	Shashemene	Arsi Negelle	Genet	Wollaita	Total	
Marriage related	10	24	7	20	61	
To study/school convenience	11	22	7	43	83	
Job and employment related	5	36	22	161	224	
To live with relatives	0	2	2	15	19	
Others	1	2	4	5	12	
Total	27	86	42	244	399	

Source: Own survey data.

At household level, out-migration is experienced by 32% of the households in the sample, see Table 5. In half of these households, more than one person migrated to urban areas. Households with youth emigrants account for 21% of the total sample and 9% send more than one youth to urban areas. Approximately 5% of the households have more than one youth who have migrated to an urban area due to employment.

**Table 5 Magnitude of out-migration (Household level, N = 613 households)** 

Variable	Percent
Migration by any member of	
household	
Migration to urban area for any purpose	32.0
Migration for work	20.6
More than one member migrated-any purpose	15.0
More than one member migrated -for work	8.3
Migration by youth member	
Migration to urban area for any purpose	21.2
Migration for work	14.2
More than one member migrated-any purpose	8.6
More than one member migrated -for work	4.7

#### **5.2** Profile of emigrants

In terms of gender of migrants, there are more female migrants than male migrants. The majority (80%) of male migrants moved to urban areas while only half of the female migrants migrated to urban areas. Female migrants are less likely to be labor migrant and more likely to have migrated because of marriage than their male counterparts (Table 6).

Migrants to rural areas are somewhat older than urban migrants but have less education than urban migrants (Table 7). Within a household, the migrating members are most commonly the sons and daughters of the household heads in the sample (95%). While 19% of the children from the sample households migrated in the period between 2007 and 2013, only 1% of the household heads and 3% of the spouses migrated in the same period.

Table 6 Migration disaggregated by gender of migrant

	Numbe	Number of migrants(All)		Numbe	Number of labor migrants		Marriage related migrants		
Migration destination	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Rural (other village)	55	165	220	11	6	17	27	146	173
Urban (city or town)	231	179	410	153	71	224	8	53	61
Total	286	344	630	164	77	241	35	199	234

Table 7 Average age and education level by gender and migration status

			Education-ye	ears of schooling
	Age of migrant (Mean)		(N	Mean)
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Rural-rural migrant	23.4	19.6	3.9	1.8
Rural-urban migrant	19.7	17.7	6.0	4.3
Non-migrant members (excluding parents)	11.8	10.2	2.0	1.2

Source: Own survey data. \* All differences between the two gender group are statistically significant

# **5.3** Youth migrants

There were 372 youth among the migrants, accounting for 57% of all migrants. The majority (62%) of the youth migrants moved to urban areas. Most of the male youth migrated to urban areas while the larger share of the female youth migrated to rural areas (Table 8).

Table 8 Youth migration from rural villages in Southern Ethiopia

	Number of migrants				
Destination	Male	Female	Total		
Rural	27	99	126		
Urban	147	85	232		
International	5	9	14		
Total	179	193	372		

Source: Own survey data

Table 9 reports the education level of youth in 2007 tabulated with migration status observed in 2013. In general we see that the majority of youth have only elementary education, and a significant percentage had no formal education. Young women are less educated than young men. We also see that as the education level increases, the proportion of youth who leaves their parents' village increases.

A disaggregate summary of education by migration destination (Table 10) shows that rural youth migrants have lower education than urban youth migrants and international migrants. Female youth who migrated to rural areas have the least average schooling with only two years of formal education while male youth who migrated to both rural and urban areas have better education with at least one year higher schooling than female youth.

Table 9 Education level of youth migrants by gender

Female Youth			Male Youth			
Education	Stay in th	Stay in the village Total		Stay in the village		Total
level 2007	Yes	No		Yes	No	
0	229	71	300	85	17	102
1	21	6	27	22	3	25
2	45	13	58	35	10	45
3	42	8	50	37	8	45
4	54	8	62	69	12	81
5	32	15	47	51	15	66
6	22	12	34	52	14	66
7	18	12	30	38	21	59
8	18	13	31	30	16	46
9	12	10	22	34	24	58
10	11	15	26	29	14	43
11	0	0	0	7	4	11
12	1	5	6	7	12	19
13	2	2	4	3	3	6
14	0	0	0	1	1	2
15	0	0	0	1	0	1
16	0	1	1	0	5	5
Total	507	191	698	501	179	680

Table 10 Youth education level by migration destination and gender

	Male edu	cation*	Female education*		
Destination	Mean	CV	Mean	CV	
Rural	4.56	0.76	2.1	1.48	
Urban	7.09	0.54	5.9	0.69	
International	8.2	0.48	7.2	0.24	
Total	6.74	0.57	4	1	

Source: Own survey data. \* The differences in educational level between male and female youth is statistically significant for rural (1%) and urban (5%) migrants but not for international migrants because of fewer observations. CV=Coefficient of variation.

In terms of purpose of migration, two-thirds of male youth migrated for employment purposes while two-thirds of female youth migrated due to marriage. Employment migrations are directed

towards the urban areas while marriage migrations are typically rural to rural. Approximately 20% of the young men migrated for further study or school convenience, almost all of which is to urban areas, while only 11% of the young women migrated for similar purposes (Table 11).

Table 11 Youth migration disaggregated by purpose of migration for male and female

	Male youth migrated to:			Female youth migrated to:		
	Rural	Urban		Rural	Urban	
Purpose of migration	area	area	Total	area	area	Total
Marriage related	14	5	19	92	27	119
To study/school convenience	2	35	37	1	19	20
Job and employment related	9	102	111	2	31	33
To live with relatives	1	0	1	2	3	5
Others	1	5	6	0	3	3
Total	27	147	174	97	83	180

Source: Own survey data.

# 5.4 Analysis of determinants of youth migration

To further analyze factors that influence the decision to migrate, we estimated a multinomial logit model where the three choices are: 1) stay in the village, 2) migrate to rural area, and 3) migrate to urban area. We included several variables that we believe explain the migration decision. At an individual level, the variables included are: age, gender and education level of the migrant in 2007. We also included household characteristics that may have bearing on the youth decision. We included age, gender and education of the household head as this may affect the attitude of the household head towards migration of its members. We also included variables that capture the labor endowment of the household. We hypothesize that youth who belong to households with larger labor force are more likely to migrate as there may be less demand for their labor at the farm. On the other hand, more adult labor at home may imply that the household has more income potential and hence less need for labor migration. The direction of the effect will thus depend on whether migration is an opportunity or a necessity.

One of the key factors that may have important implications for migration is farm size. As we are analyzing migration of youth from farming households we expect that their access to land will have influence on their migration decisions. To reflect this access to land we include per capita farm size in the estimation. We hypothesize that larger per capita farm size signals better access to land and hence rural income and therefore will be negatively correlated with migration. On the other hand, larger land holding may also be an indicator of household wealth which will influence the capacity of the household to finance migration, especially if the migration is for educational purposes. The direction of the correlation will thus be determined by the relative strength of the incentive effect versus the capacity effect. We also include livestock holdings to control for wealth of the household. We expect that youth from better-off households have less incentive to migrate. However, if the capacity to finance migration is a more important constraint, it may be positively correlated with migration since wealthier households are more able to finance migration of members. District dummies are also included to control for agroecological conditions and district level unobservable factors.

Table 12 shows the results from the multinomial model. In a multinomial model, we can make only pair-wise comparison with the base outcome. The base outcome in our model is staying in the village. Hence, the results in the table show how a change in a specific variable influences the probability of migrating relative to staying in the village. We report both the coefficient and the odds ratio.

Table 12 Multinomial model estimation of determinants of youth migration decision

	Migration to another rural area			Migration to urban area				
			Robust	Odds				Odds
	Coeff.		s.e	ratio	Coeff.		Robust s.e	ratio
Individual Characteristics								
Female Youth	1.500	****	0.301	4.480	0.057		0.193	1.059
Age	0.377		0.257	1.458	0.132		0.235	1.141
Age squared	-0.009		0.006	0.991	-0.005		0.005	0.995
Education level (yrs of schooling)	-0.009		0.042	0.991	0.241	****	0.028	1.272
<b>Household Characteristics</b>								
Female headed household	-0.042		0.303	0.959	-0.042		0.403	0.959
Age of household head	0.029	***	0.009	1.030	0.031	****	0.009	1.031
Education of household head	-0.086		0.053	0.917	-0.003		0.032	0.997
Number of male work force	0.021		0.082	1.021	0.118		0.085	1.126
Number of female work force	0.144	*	0.081	1.155	0.100		0.123	1.105
Household size	0.004		0.045	1.004	-0.014		0.056	0.986
Farm size per capita	-0.549		0.565	0.578	-0.062		1.720	0.940
Livestock (in TLU)	-0.029	***	0.011	0.972	-0.039	**	0.017	0.961
District dummies: Baseline=Shashe	emene							
Arsi Negelle	-0.128		0.284	0.879	1.175	***	0.446	3.239
Wondo Genet	-1.580	***	0.570	0.206	0.049		0.426	1.051
Wollaita	-0.297		0.359	0.743	2.271	****	0.355	9.689
Constant	-7.937	***	2.789	0.000	-6.406	**	2.585	0.002
Prob > chi2	0.000							
Loglikelihood	-735.913							
Number of Obs.	1257							

Note: The reference livelihood strategy (base outcome) is agriculture. Significance levels: \*: 10%, \*\*: 5%, \*\*\*: 1%, \*\*\*\*: 0.1%.

The estimation results show that in terms of individual characteristics, different factors influence the decision to migrate to rural and urban areas. For migration to rural areas, gender of the migrant is an important factor. Compared to young men, young women are more likely to migrate to another village than stay in their parents' village. The odds of young women migrating to another village is more than four times that of young men, holding other factors constant. This is most likely related to the marriage migration as discussed earlier. Gender did not affect migration to urban areas relative to staying in the village. For migration to urban areas, education is the most important factor. Youth with more years of education have higher likelihood of migrating to urban areas than stay in the village. An increase in years of schooling by one year increases the odds of migrating to urban area relative to staying in the village by a factor of 1.27. This is also in line with our expectation that education increases the employment opportunities for youth in urban areas thereby providing incentive to migrate.

The household characteristics that are statistically significant are age of the household head and female labor. Youth who belong to households with older household head are more likely to migrate to both to urban areas and other rural areas than to stay in the village. This may reflect either that the parental control grows weaker enabling youth to migrate, or that with the household head getting older, there is more need for additional income from migration and employment in other areas. Female labor is positively correlated with migration to rural areas. This is not surprising since household chores exclusively fall on women and the existence of more female labor in the household implies less pressure on individual female youth to help her mother. But it is significant only at 10% level of significance. Farm size has a negative sign consistent with the push factor hypothesis but it was not found to be significant at the conventional level of significance perhaps because of the pull in the opposite direction of the incentive to migrate and the capacity to finance migration. On the other hand, we see that livestock-poor households are more likely to have migrating youth members indicating that resource poverty is a push factor as livestock is an indicator of wealth.

Youth from Wondo Genet district are less likely to migrate to other villages. Although farm sizes are small in Wondo Genet district, the area has high agriculture potential with access to irrigation that enables farmers to produce cash crops and earn better than farmers in other areas. On the

other hand, youth from Arsi Negelle and Damot Sore (Wollaita) are more likely to migrate to urban areas than stay in the village. Farming in Damot Sore is subsistence oriented and farm size in the area is very small. While farms in Arsi Negelle are larger than those in other areas, some of the villages have been food insecure in the past, indicating poorer performance of agriculture (Bezu & Holden, 2014a).

#### 5.5 Migration and land access

Farm sizes in the research areas are very small, averaging 0.86 hectares. This is barely sufficient to produce enough food for an existing household. But such small farm size is also likely to make inheritance and other transfers of land by parents a very difficult task. For example, in 2013 the farm households in our sample have an average of five children, including youth and young adults. If parents were to share their farm among all their children, the resulting farm would be too small to cultivate and would also be much below the legal minimum farm sizes in rural areas (Bezu and Holden, 2014a). The migration of some of the youth from these villages would thus increase the potential of those remaining behind to obtain agricultural land. Our study on youth livelihood choice and land access (Bezu and Holden, 2014a) shows how the expectation of land inheritance influences livelihood decisions of youth. We found that relative to farming, first born children are more likely to choose agricultural livelihood as they have a better chance of receiving land from their parents. On the other hand, young women are less likely to choose agricultural livelihood because women and girls are less likely to receive farm land.

# 6 Unfolding rural-urban migration: Migration experience of youth

This section discusses youth migration experience using data from a survey of 75 youth who were residents of Southern Ethiopia in 2007 but moved to different towns and cities in the 2007 – 2013 periods. These youth were tracked and surveyed in 31 towns and urban centers across Ethiopia (see Appendix).

# **6.1** Profile of tracked migrants

Table 13 reports basic descriptive statistics on the tracked migrant youth. Out of the 75 youth tracked, 23 (31%) were female. The average age is 24 and the average education is 12 years of schooling, which is equivalent to high-school completion. This level of education is certainly higher than the education level for those who stay in the village (3.5) or those who migrated to other rural areas (4.2), but how this is compared to the education level of a typical youth migrant is difficult to tell since we do not have a reference to compare it with. The only relevant reference we know of is the higher high-school attendance rate (60%) for the relevant age group in urban areas compared to a much lower rate for the same group in rural areas (10%) (CSA & ICF, 2012

One-third of the youth are students. There are proportionately more students among the female migrants than male migrants. In addition, proportionately more of the male youth migrants are married and have kids than the female migrants. Those who are not students, and are thus largely employed, earn an average of more than Birr 1300 per month. Female youth earn less than male youth.

Table 13 Socio economic characteristics of tracked youth

	male	female	Total
Age (mean)	24.9	22.7	24.2
Education-successfully completed grade- (mean)	12.2	11.2	11.9
Student (%)	33	43	36
Married youth (%)	35	22	31
Have a child (%)	27	22	25
Monthly income for non-students (mean)	1517	836	1335
Years lived in this city (mean)	3.88	4.04	3.93
Total Number	52	23	75

Source: Own survey data.

## 6.2 Migration decision and journey from the village

The average age of the youth at the time of the first migration<sup>14</sup> was 18 years, which coincides with the age of high school completion for students. On average youth have 9 years of formal education before their first migration from the village. There is more variation in the level of education of youth (Figure 3) relative to the distribution in age (Figure 4).




Figure 3 Age distribution of migrant youth at the time of the first migration

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The first migration could be the current migration or any earlier migration




Figure 4 Distribution of years of education of youth at the time of the first migration

The majority of the tracked youth (70%) reported education as the primary reason for migrating from their village. This could be related to absence of higher education close to their village or because of quality concern. For those who are not migrating due to education, the motivation differs by gender. For female youth attraction of urban life and livelihood is the main reason next to education while for male it is the wish to help parents with additional income.

Table 14 Summary of main reasons for migrating to urban areas

	F	emale		Male	,	Total
Main reason for migrating	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Not interested in rural life/attracted by urban						
livelihood	4	17.4	2	3.8	6	8
To help family with income	1	4.4	11	21.2	12	16
Dispute/trouble in the village	0	0.0	1	1.9	1	1.3
To avoid early marriage	1	4.4	0	0.0	1	1.3
To study	16	69.6	37	71.2	53	70.7
Other	1	4.4	1	1.9	2	2.7
Total	23	100	52	100	75	100

Parents typically agree with the migration decision of the youth and in most cases cover the costs of the migration. 88% of the tracked migrants in our sample report that their parents agreed with the migration and 68% report that their migration cost is covered by their parents. Only 7% of the youth indicated that they have borrowed money to finance the migration. The migrants gravitate towards towns and cities where they have contacts. 71% of the youth migrants report that they know at least one person at the destination of their first migration. In the majority of the cases these are relatives (83%) and in some cases friends (15%).

The average monetary cost of migration is about 757<sup>15</sup> Birr. But there is variation in the costs ranging from 8 Birr to 4000 Birr<sup>16</sup>. The differences are likely to be influenced by distance, the need of the individual, availability of networks, capacity of the migrant or parents to cover more comfortable migration and other factors. For about 10% of the youth the cost is 50 Birr or less while for the other 10% in the upper end the cost is 2700 Birr and more. Youth in Oromia region report higher costs of migration than youth in SNNP region<sup>17</sup>. But it appears that having a network significantly reduces the costs of migration with those without migration network spending double the migration expenditure than those without such network.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> 1USD≈ 18 Birr

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> We have excluded an unlikely (and only) observation with 50000 Birr cost. We suspect that it is an error.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Because the 75 youth were interviewed in a large number of towns (more than 30), we cannot meaningfully disaggregate costs by destination.

Many youth travel with a companion. In our sample, 43% of the migrants travelled at least with one other person when they left their village. The migration companions are usually relatives or friends. Youth were more likely to travel with companions if they were migrating for the first time. While half of the youth who migrated for the first time had travel companions, only one-third of those with earlier migration experience travelled with companions.

Youth seem to migrate in steps rather than move directly to their city of settlement. The data shows that 60% of the youth have migrated to another city or town before their current residence. In addition, slightly more than half of the youth (53%) plan to move forward to another city or town.

#### 6.3 Migrants' life in the urban area

#### 6.3.1 Employment

The most common occupation of these youth migrants is studying, which accounts for 27%. It appears that youth from rural areas primarily engage in human capital accumulation before fully joining the labor market. The non-students are engaged in diverse employment activities ranging from professional salaried employment, which typically demand more than high-school education, to employment as day laborer, which needs no education. Few of the youth were unemployed.

Table 15 Primary occupation of migrant youth

Current primary occupation	Freq.	Perc	ent
Student		27	36
Day laborer/porter		5	6.7
Shoe shiner		1	1.3
Maid/guard private home		1	1.3
Shop keeper		1	1.3
Skilled worker-construction		3	4
Low-level employee-civil service		3	4
Professional salaried worker		21	28
Run own business		5	6.7
'Woyala/redat'-conductor		2	2.7
Unemployed		5	6.7
Other		1	1.3
Total		75	100

Source: Own survey data

Table 16 reports youth earnings per month for the non-student sample. On average ,youth earn 1335 Birr<sup>18</sup> per month. Male youth earn more than female youth. This is an indication that female youth are engaged in less paying employment activities.

Table 16 Monthly income for tracked youth

	Mean	Median	CV
Male	1516.9	1233	0.678
Female	835.9	1000	0.575
Total	1335.3	1200	0.719

Source: Own survey data

### 6.3.2 Social network of youth migrants

We will now assess the social network of the youth migrants in our traced youth sample based on their responses to a number of our questions. We see from Table 17 that 71% of the traced migrated youth know someone at their first migration destination.

**Table 17 Network at first migration destination** 

Know anyone at first migration destination	Freq.	Percent
No	22	29.3
Yes	53	70.7
Total	75	100.0

Source: Own survey data.

Table 18 shows that the large majority of those contacts at the destination point for the first migration were relatives, demonstrating the importance of family networks. We cannot rule out that our traced sample of youth migrants, where we have relied on family networks, contributes to this strong role of family networks at destination locations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> An unskilled day laborer earns 60-70 Birr per day in Addis Ababa. Typically the work of day laborers is physically demanding and intensive while SSCV youth have low intensity work

Table 18 Type of network at the first migration destination

If know anyone, what is the relationship	Freq.	Percent
No relation	4	7.0
Relative	44	77.2
Friend	8	14.0
Acquaintance	1	1.8
Total	57	100.0

To get an idea about the width of social networks of the migrant youth we asked how many relatives, friends and acquaintances of different degree and how many trusted people they have in their current area of residence. Table 19 summarizes the average responses for these variables.

Table 19 Migrant youth's social capital and network

	Number of individuals in the network				
Relation	Mean	Std.Err	Median	Min	Max
Close relatives	2.9	0.84	1	0	60
Distant relatives	6.3	2.81	0	0	200
Friends	3.8	0.50	2	0	30
Acquaintances	63.8	12.3	11	0	500
Total excluding acquaintance	12.6	3.64	5	1	263
Trusted persons	2.22	0.25	2	0	11

Source: Own survey data.

The average migrant has 2.9 close relatives, 6.3 distant relatives, 3.8 friends, 64 acquaintances, and 2.2 trusted persons in the new location. Trust seems to be an issue for the migrant youth. The number of close relatives and friends is higher than the number of people the youth would consider trusted. We would like to see which factors determine or are associated with the number of trusted persons the youth migrants have. This is a non-negative count variable and we have therefore used a negative binomial regression which is a more flexible alternative to poisson models that also tests whether there is an over-dispersion problem in the data which may invalidate the poisson model.

We expect that the number of trusted persons that the migrants have increases for those who stayed longer in the town/city, increases with the number of relatives they have, increase with

the number of friends they have, increase with age (maturity), is higher for males than for females (cultural norms may restrict the number of contacts females have), increase with the birth rank (older siblings may be more trusted), and increase with education (assuming there is more trust among more education people who stick together). The results of the model are presented in Table 20. We included district dummies for the districts of origin of the youth and corrected standard errors for clustering on their areas (zones) of origin.

Table 20 Factors associated with the number of trusted persons migrants have

	Marginal effects	
RHS Variables	dy/dx	P>z
Years stayed in current location	.044	0.241
Close relatives, number	118	0.000
Distant relatives, number	.052	0.000
Number of friends	.139	0.000
Number of acquaintances	.0002	0.844
Age	.031	0.680
Gender	203	0.621
Birth rank	.140	0.000
Years of completed schooling	.037	0.094
District of origin: Baseline = Shashemene		
Arsi Negelle	.836	0.000
Wondo Genet	2.236	0.000
Wollaita	.731	0.000
Constant	862	0.279
/lnalpha	-2.607	
Number of observations	69	

Source: Own survey data. Note: Marginal effects from negative binomial models with cluster robust standard errors with clustering at zone level, showing the P-values from the estimation.

Table 20 shows surprisingly that the number of close relatives is negatively (significant at 0.1% level) correlated with the number of trusted persons. This is contrary to our expectation as more close relatives can be assumed to imply more people who may have stronger interest on the welfare of the migrant. On the other hand it is positively (significant at 0.1% levels) correlated with the number of more distant relatives and number of friends. The coefficients indicate that

one more close relative is associated with a reduction in the number of trusted persons by 0.12 while one more distant relative is associated with 0.05 more trusted persons and one more friend is associated with 0.14 more trusted persons. The birth rank was also highly significant and with a positive sign. Having one more elder sibling is associated with having 0.14 more trusted persons. Education level of the migrant was barely significant at 10% level and with a positive sign, giving only a weak indication that more educated migrants have more trusted persons in the new location. There were also highly significant differences between the districts of origin for the migrants with particularly migrants from Wondo Genet (the cash cropping area) having more trusted persons. We should, however, be careful as there were few observations from Shashemene district (baseline) and Wondo Genet. The negative value for the *lnalpha* constant indicates that over-dispersion was not a serious problem in our data. The small sample size, the potential sample selection bias, and the potential endogeneity of the variables give reasons to caution about the generalizability of these findings. Relatives and friends, including trusted persons could serve as substitutes or complements in how the migrants operate in their new environments. More in-depth studies are required to disentangle these issues more carefully.

#### 6.3.3 Social safety net in urban areas

One way we explore the social safety net available for youth is by asking about the maximum length of time youth can rely on relatives and friends to provide food and shelter if they had no saving and they lose employment and income source. Three out of ten youth believe that they do not have the social safety net to provide them with sustenance in the case of loss of income and employment (Table 21). These youth are very vulnerable in the cities because they have left their parents and their villages where they would have been afforded with a fall back options in times of crisis, while in the city there are no formal institutions that provide support for unemployed youth. These youth, thus, risk ending up in the streets with dire consequences for their future and current welfare.

Table 21 Youth's informal social protection during loss of income/saving

		Nυ	mber of we	eeks	
	Youth with no such	food/s	helter prov	ided for	Youth with no concern
	provision	those with protection		ection	for food/shelter
	(%)	min	mean	Max	%
Provision of food	29	1	24.5	108	31
Provision of shelter	31	1	26.4	108	32

For those with possibility to obtain food and shelter from relatives and friends, the average length of time the provision is available is about six months, with a slightly longer period for shelter provision than food. For the rest of the youth (31-32%), access to food and shelter is not a concern or the question is irrelevant in the short run. These youth include public college students who live in government provided campuses, or high school and private college students who live with their sibling or other very close relative who may be taking all the responsibility of their sustenance in the city. This group also include non-student youth who live with their husband or wife and believe that their personal loss of income will not deprive them of food and shelter.

We also explore youth migrants' access to credit. Table 22 gives an overview of credit obtained and requested from our small traced sample of youth migrants.

Table 22 Access to credit among youth migrants

Credit access	Percent
Borrowed money in the current city at least once	55
Never tried to borrow money	31
Tried to borrow but failed, at least in one occasion	56

Source: Own survey data. The numbers in the table is the number of respondents.

More than half of the youth have borrowed funds at least once since they moved to the city. Close to 31% of youth reported that they did not seek to borrow while the rest (15%) never borrowed because they were refused. But even for those who borrowed at one time, it is not always easy to obtain loan so the youth that have failed to borrow at least once since they moved to the city account for 56%. Table 23 shows the recent lenders for those who reported to have borrowed.

Table 23 Sources of credit for youth migrants

Lender	Freq.	Percent
Friends	27	65.9
Relative	3	7.3
Neighbor/colleague	7	17.1
Credit association	4	9.8
Total	41	100

We see that the large majority of those who borrowed money obtained this money from their friends while very few borrowed from relatives. This is an indicator of the strong network among friends and the ability of youth to support each other in terms of credit access now in the city compared to when youth were in their rural village. Our earlier discussion in the previous section showed that only 5 youth borrowed money in the village to finance their migration and only three of them borrowed from relatives. Many got assistance to travel from their parents.

## 6.4 Urban tenure security 1: Housing for migrants

Here we discuss the housing conditions for the tracked youth migrant including the tenancy type, rents and tenure security. Table 24 reports the tenancy type. Two-third of the youth lives in rented units while 23% are lucky to live for free and 7% own their housing.

Table 24 Housing condition for traced migrant youth

Tenancy condition for youth's			
residence	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Own it	5	6.7	67
Rented	49	65.3	72.0
Live legally for free	17	22.7	94.7
Others	4	5.3	100.0
Total	75	100.0	

Source: Own survey data.

Table 25 reports what influenced the choice of neighborhood for housing. We see that proximity to work is the most common factor that determines choice of location for housing. It does not appear that price is an important criterion for choosing neighbourhood in this sample.

Table 25 Reasons for Choice of neighborhood

Reason for choice of residential neighborhood	Freq.	Percent
Low price	6	8.00
Proximity to work	28	37.3
Free access	14	18.7
Easier to rent	4	5.3
Emotional attachment	18	24.0
Others	5	6.7
Total	75	100

Source: Own survey data.

For those who live in rented housing, we asked whether they rented alone or with another person. We found that the majority (75%) rented jointly with some other person. And of those who rented jointly with others, 35% shared the housing with their spouse, 28% with friends, and 28% with relatives while others live with other roommates.

The average rent per month (or the individual share for those who rented jointly) is 200 Birr. But there is wide variation with some paying as much as 1000 Birr. Figure 5 shows the variation in monthly rent paid for housing by the traced youth in our sample. We see that the peak of the distribution is around 100 Birr per month and the maximum is 1000 Birr per month.




Figure 5 Distribution of monthly house rent paid by youth migrants

How tenure secure are the youth migrants in their current residence? Table 26 reports the summary of the responses for the question "Do you fear that you may be evicted (forced to leave) from this house/unit without your fault?"

Table 26 Fear of eviction from housing among youth migrants

Fear eviction from housing without fault		
Live in rented housing	42	
Live legally rent free housing	18	
Live in owned house/have other arrangement	0	

Source: Own survey data.

We see that 42% of youth who rented a housing unit fear eviction while only 18% of those who live for free have similar insecurity. Those who live in rent free arrangement usually live with relatives. It also includes youth who live on university campuses. None of the youth who live in owned house or through other arrangements fear eviction.

As indicated earlier, 37% of the traced youth migrants fear that they may be evicted from their house due to no fault of theirs, indicating their tenure insecurity. Here we analyze the factors associated with tenure insecurity. While the sample is small we still tested an instrumental variable probit (IVProbit) on the data to see how this tenure security may be associated with social network. Keeping in mind that number of trusted people was closely related to number of friends we used the latter as an instrument to predict the former. We argue that their friends are not likely to have a direct impact on their housing security, while relatives living in the city may have as they even may provide them the housing. Living with relatives may, however, also be a burden on the family relationship. We, therefore, propose that number of relatives can have an ambiguous relation to housing security. We also propose that experience and search time in the city has helped the migrants to find more secure housing. We also propose that older migrants may find trusted landlords more easily and so do more educated youth. We do not have any clear theory on how gender is associated with housing tenure security but we include the variable to assess whether it is significantly related to housing security. Again the small sample with potential sample selection bias due to the difficulty of tracing migrants gives good reason to caution the weight put on these results. Nevertheless, we provide the econometric results in Table 27 below.

We see that housing tenure security is positively correlated with the predicted number of trusted persons the migrant has. This could just be a personal characteristic such that more trusting people also feel less tenure insecure (they may be more naïve or optimistic) or they have utilized their social network to achieve more secure housing. The marginal effect is large for this variable. The 'number of relatives' variable was also significant and with a positive sign meaning that more relatives is associated with higher housing tenure insecurity. This may imply that also those staying with relatives do not feel secure. Surprisingly, the length of stay in the city is also positively correlated with insecurity of housing. One possible explanation for this could be that temporary housing has been found with some persons they know but that it is expected as time goes that they find some alternative housing and have difficulties in finding more secure housing as time goes. The test for exogeneity of the instrument (number of friends) was rejected.

Table 27 Factors associated with housing tenure security

	Marginal effects	
	dy/dx	P>z
Number of trusted people, predicted	368	0.002
Number of relatives in the city	.006	0.000
Years stayed in current location	.126	0.000
Age	.069	0.519
Gender	.030	0.930
Years of completed schooling	038	0.470
Zone of origin, baseline=Oromia		
Sidama	.306	0.005
Wollaita	007	0.937
Constant	-1.308	0.632
/athrho	1.327	0.010
/lnsigma	.485	0.002
Rho	.868	
Sigma	1.624	
Number of observations	61	

Instrument: Number of friends. Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) = 6.63 Prob > chi2 = 0.01. Model Wald chi2(2) = 12.03 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0024).

# **6.5** Evaluating migration experience- Youth's own perception

#### 6.5.1 Challenges

Table 28 summarizes the challenges youth migrants face the first three months after they arrive in the new location. Place to stay was cited as the most important challenge by more than 20% of the youth while access to work, food and other sustenance were the most important challenge for 35% of the youth.

Table 28 Challenges youth migrants faced during the first three months in the city

	The most important		The se	econd most	The	third most
	ch	challenge		important challenge		ant challenge
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
No response/no challenge	3	4.05	15	20.55	31	42.47
Place to stay	16	21.62	8	10.96	4	5.48
Work/job	13	17.57	2	2.74	5	6.85
Making friends	5	6.76	8	10.96	9	12.33
Language	1	1.35	4	5.48	4	5.48
Getting around						
places/confusion	9	12.16	12	16.44	3	4.11
Food/money for sustenance	13	17.57	14	19.18	12	16.44
Access to education	4	5.41	5	6.85	1	1.37
Other	10	13.51	5	6.85	4	5.48
Total	74	100.00	73	100.00	73	100.00

Currently as many as a quarter of the youth report no challenge. Money for sustenance is still an issue for 27% of the youth while place to stay is less of a challenge now that at the early days of life in the city (Table 29).

Table 29 Challenges youth migrants currently face in the city

		The second most		cond most	The third most	
	The mo	The most important		important current		ant current
	currer	nt challenge	cha	allenge	challenge	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
No response/ no challenge	20	27.40	41	57.75	55	77.46
Place to stay	9	12.33	3	4.23	2	2.82
Work/job	7	9.59	8	11.27	3	4.23
Making friends	4	5.48	1	1.41	2	2.82
Language			3	4.23		
Food/money for						
sustenance	21	28.77	11	15.49	3	4.23
Access to education	4	5.48	1	1.41	2	2.82
Other	8	10.96	3	4.23	4	5.63
Total	73	100.00	71	100.00	71	100.00

We will now look at the perceived experiences compared to the *ex-ante* expectations of the traced migrants. Table 30 reports their rating of access to housing and employment, level of security, easiness to integrate with the locals and finding friends in the new location, and the overall living costs. While these responses are based on individuals' own expectation versus their individual experience, it may also give indication as to how realistic youth's expectations are in rural villages.

Table 30 Perceptions versus ex-ante expectations about the new location

	Finding	Finding		Integration	n with	Living
	accommodation	employment	security	locals		costs
Expectation	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
No response		2.8				
No expectation	5.3	9.7	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
Much worse	1.3	6.9				9.3
Worse	22.7	34.7	10.8	12.2	17.3	41.3
As expected	33.3	23.6	33.8	35.1	33.3	32.0
Better	30.7	20.8	46.0	37.8	45.3	13.3
Much better	6.7	1.4	8.1	13.5	2.7	2.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The results shows that in most of the indicators, expectation of the youth appear to be realistic and even conservative. The majority felt that security, integration with locals and finding friends was as good as or better than expected while finding employment and cost of living was worse than their expectation.

#### 6.5.2 Assessment of wellbeing

Youth were asked to assess their wellbeing in terms of their health situation before and after the migration and indicate their overall satisfaction with their life in the urban area. The evaluation of health in reference to pre-migration status is reported in Table 31. As this is based on recall of the health situation in the past, it may be susceptible to recall bias. But we hope that this bias is small as we asked for the general health condition and it has been only less than six years since the migration. The table shows that the majority of youth were healthy before migration and their health remains stable. It is, however, possible to have a lower health outcome if migrants are exposed to livelihood and shelter problems, which does not seem to be a significant problem in our sample of tracked youth. We cannot, however, say much about how representative they are for the untracked youth. It is possible and likely that the tracked youth are the more successful ones.

Table 31 Comparison of youth migrant health before migration and now

Health situation before	Health situation Now						
migration	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very poor		Total
Very good	44	1	1	3		0	49
Good	1	16	2	0		0	19
Fair	0	2	0	0		0	2
Poor	1	2	0	0		0	3
Very poor	1	0	0	0		1	2
Total	47	21	3	3		1	75

Table 32 shows the general satisfaction level of youth. Generally, 63% of the youth interviewed were satisfied or very satisfied with their life in urban areas and 23% were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.

Table 32 Satisfaction level of youth migrants from Southern Ethiopia

Overall satisfaction	Freq.	P	ercent
Very satisfied		13	17.33
Fairly satisfied		34	45.33
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied		11	14.66
Dissatisfied		16	21.33
Very dissatisfied		1	1.33
Total		75	100

Source: Own survey data.

## 6.6 Youth migrants' relationship with parents/family in the village

The majority of the youth (72%) migrants reported that if they want to, they are able to go back to the village and establish a livelihood. This may be an indication that the youth are able to maintain a strong relationship with their families back home which will facilitate their return and reintegration in the economic and social activity back in the village. The first issue we explore in

this regard is whether the youth have received any land or expect to receive any land from their parents. Youth who have inherited land from parents and relatives may have more motivation and expectation to establish their livelihood in the village. Table 33 shows land inheritance status of youth and their opinion on their ability to establish a livelihood in the village. First, we see that a quarter of the youth have already received land while an additional 46% expect to inherit land sometime. Those who did not receive land and do not expect to receive any in the future, account for 28%. But, interestingly the proportion of youth who reported that they are able to go back to the village and obtain a livelihood is the same regardless of whether or not the youth has access to agricultural land through their inheritance from the family. This is perhaps an indication that the migrant youth in urban areas are envisioning primarily non-farm based livelihood if they return to rural areas.

Table 33 Access to land in home village for traced migrated youth

	Able to go back to the village and establish livelihood				
	Total				
Land inheritance from parents	No (%)	Yes(%)	observation		
Received land	28	72	18		
Not received but expect to inherit/receive land	29	71	35		
Not received, does not expect to receive land	29	71	21		
Total	28	72	74		

Source: Own survey data.

The majority of the youth keep contact with the family by calling parents and siblings, visiting them and getting visits from their relatives. As much as 93% had had contact through mobile phone and 92% had visited their home village at least once the last one year. As much as 61% of the migrated youth had also been visited at least once by a member of their rural family in the same period. Table 34 shows the frequency of the contact and the amount of remittance sent and received by migrants.

Table 34 Migrant youth contact with relatives in the village during the last one year

Youth's contact with parents and siblings in the				Non-
village in the last one year	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	zero
Number of phone contacts	0	58.1	300	93%
Number of own visits to the village	0	14.1	58	92%
Number of visits from relatives from the village	0	7.0	54	61%
Number of times remittance sent to village	0	9.0	24	43%
Number of times remittance received from				
village	0	4.9	49	49%
Amount of remittance sent to village	0	843	5000	
Amount of remittance received from village	0	1857	12000	

The flow of resources between urban and rural areas is not in one direction. In fact, it appears that in this sample of migrants, the proportion of remittance receiving youth (49%) is somewhat higher than the proportion of remittance sending youth (43%). The amount of remittance received is also higher than that sent by youth migrants. In addition, 13% of the youth who sent remittances have themselves received some. The highest transfer from rural areas is made to unemployed youth and students. Note that students, half of whom are in college, account for one-third of the sample.

Of the youth migrants who sent remittances, 35% revealed that they sent money to the family back home without being asked. The reasons they gave for doing so were "I know they need it" (62%), "to please them" (29%), and "it makes me happy" (9%). Only about 20% of the youth stated that they at least once had refused to provide help to their parents/family when they were asked for it. The reason they gave for this was that they did not have money at that time. In general, it appears that there is a strong contact between migrants and their family back in the village and that the flow of resources follows the capacity and the need of both the migrants and their relatives instead of geographic location. There is a caveat in this observation, however. We were unable to trace about 50% of the migrated youth from our households. It is likely that the ones we were able to trace are have a much better relationship with their parents and stay in frequent contact and hence they may not be a perfect representative of all youth migrants.

## 7 Youth migrants in informal self-employment in urban areas

The data used here is from the survey of youth engaged in SSCV in cities of Hawassa and Addis Ababa. It is clear from our data that SSCV is dominated by migrant youth. Although during sample selection we included all youth in the randomly selected clusters in Addis Ababa and in the main streets of Hawassa, we found that only 7 of the 445 youth in the sample were born in the respective cities. The rest are migrants (Table 35).

Table 35 Sample of youth engaged in SSCV in Addis Ababa and Hawassa

Migration status	Addis Ababa	Hawassa	Total
Migrant	147	291	438
Born in the city	2	5	7
Total	149	296	445

Source: Own survey data.

The majority of the youth migrants in the SSCV sample are male youth (77%) in both locations (Table 36). About one third of the female youth are married and about 5% of them have been divorced. About 8% of the male youth are married and none are divorced (Table 37).

Table 36 Youth migrant by gender

Migrant	Male	Female	Total
Addis Ababa	111	36	147
Hawassa	226	65	291
Total	337	101	438

Source: Own survey data.

**Table 37 Gender versus marriage status of migrants** 

	Migrant marriage status					
Gender	Married	Single	Divorced	Total		
Male	27	312	0	339		
Female	37	64	5	106		
Total	64	376	5	445		

## 7.1 Origin of migrants

Table 38 reports the origin of the migrants to the two cities surveyed. Although migrants came from four regions of Ethiopia, the overwhelming majority came from SNNP. Migrants from SNNP account for 94% of all SSCV sample in Hawassa and 84% in Addis Ababa.

Table 38 Origin of migrants in the SSCV survey

	Addis Ababa	Hawassa	All m	igrants
Origin of migrants	Percent	Percent	Number	Percent
Tigray region		0.7	2	0.5
Amhara region	12.2	2.8	28	6.4
Oromia region	3.8	2.4	15	3.4
SNNP region	84.0	94.2	393	89.7
Total	100	100	438	100

Source: Own survey data.

After SNNP, Amhara region supplied the most migrants, although still less than 10%. This is somewhat in-line with the national level statistics which shows that SNNP and Amhara regions are two of the three regions with negative net migration (CSA, 2013). Within SNNP region, the Wollaita and Guraghe zones supply the largest share of youth migrants (Table 39). In the Addis Ababa sample, half of the youth migrants are from the Wollaita zone, and one-third from the Guraghe zone. In Hawassa, 60% are from the Wollaita zone and 19% from the Guraghe zone.

Table 39 Disaggregation of migration from SNNP region

Administrative	Addi	is Ababa	A	wassa	7	Γotal
zone <sup>1</sup>	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Wollaita	63	51.6	156	56.9	219	55.7
Guraghe	42	34.4	52	19.0	94	23.9
Sidama			48	17.5	48	12.2
Hadiya	12	9.8	1	0.4	10	2.5
Kembata			10	3.6	4	1.0
Gamogofa	1	0.8	3	1.1	3	0.8
Keffa	1	0.8	1	0.4	13	3.3
Gedio	3	2.5	3	1.1	2	0.5
Total	122	100	274	100	393	100

Note: Administrative zones within SNNP are set across ethnic lines so that each zone represents one ethnic group or two or more closely related ethnic groups. Source: Own survey data.

Proximity to the city does not seem to be the dominant factor for source of migrants. The two dominant zones are not particularly nearer to the cities than others. For Hawassa, for example, the Sidama zone is the closest and among the 13 zones in SNNP region, there are three zones closer to Hawassa than Wollaita and six zones closer than Guraghe. Population pressures, poor agricultural potential of farms and access to infrastructure are perhaps more important incentives to migrate (Bezu & Holden, 2014b). In addition, group migration, networking, and information from earlier migrants are important factors that may facilitate more migration from some places than others with similar economic and environmental conditions. The migration literature indicates that segmentation of migration streams is very common and the poorest areas may not have the highest rate of out-migration (De Haan, 1999)

### 7.2 Socio-economic characteristics of youth engaged in street based self-employment.

Almost all male youth (99%) are engaged in shoe shining, including those who carry out other activities such as selling merchandize, car washing and working as a porter as a side business. There are some young women who are engaged in shoe shining but the overwhelming majority are engaged in street coffee vending, including those who sell some food items and merchandize

on the side. Proportionately more of the female youth are married and have kids compared to male youth in the sample.

Table 40 Socio-economic characteristics of Youth in street based self-employment

	Male	Female		Significance
	Youth	Youth	All	test
Engaged in shoe shining, share	0.99	0.07	0.77	***
Engaged in Coffee-vending, share	0.01	0.93	0.23	***
Married, share	0.08	0.35	0.14	***
Have a child, share	0.05	0.41	0.13	***
Years lived in the city	3.82	7.40	4.68	***
Age	19.73	21.94	20.26	***
Education (highest grade completed)	6.09	5.53	5.96	**
Income per month, Birr	929	893	920	Not sign.
Expect to remain in the occupation, share	0.19	0.32	0.22	
N (observation)	339	106	445	

Source: Own survey data.

It appears that for male youth migrants, SSCV is an entry level self-employment that serves as a transition stage towards better wage employment and business while for the women it appears less so. The average number of years male youth migrants lived in their current location of residence is 3.8, while female youth had stayed on average 7.4 years in the current location. While 32% of female youth want to remain in their current job or occupation, only 19% of male youth do so. And this is not because the job female youth are doing is paying better, in fact they earn on average slightly lower income per month than male youth (although the difference was not statistically significant). We also found that SSCV youth in Addis Ababa, both male and female, earn on average more than youth in Hawassa. Youth in Addis Ababa earn on average 1198 Birr per month while youth in Hawassa earn 780 Birr per month. This is not surprising since Addis Ababa is a big city with more customers and a higher charge for the services.

The female youth in this sample are significantly older than the male youth and have on average less education. A detailed summary of the educational level of the migrants is given in Table 41.

Table 41 Education by gender and years completed

	Ge	Gender			
Highest completed grade in years	Male	Female	Total		
0	9	19	28		
1	1	1	2		
2	8	4	12		
3	33	5	38		
4	32	10	42		
5	53	9	62		
6	59	14	73		
7	49	9	58		
8	48	17	65		
9	14	4	18		
10	25	7	32		
11	3	0	3		
12	0	4	4		
13	4	2	6		
14	1	1	2		
Total	339	106	445		

Both male and female youth migrants have lower levels of education than the traked youth sample. More than half of the young men and women never reached beyond the six grade. However, the proportion of young women with no education (19%) is much higher than that for young men (3%). Compared with the traced youth sample we see that youth in the informal self-employment are less educated, perhaps indicating the lack of entry barrier in the sector which attracts the less endowed.

#### 7.3 Establishment of business at current location.

Although the SSCV is an informal self-employment that is based on business on the street, finding a space to work is difficult even when there is a market for it. There are basically two forms of SSCV: stationed and mobile. Youth in stationed SSCV have a designated area where individuals have a *de facto* recognized spot to set up their business. While all the materials used for shoe shining and coffee making are packed and moved every day at the end of the working day, the specific spots are recognized and respected within the group of SSCV stationed in that place. On the other hand, youth in the mobile SSCV carry their materials in a small parcel or box

and move from place to place looking for customers. They work in places that have demand but are restricted from stationed SSCV. Or they walk long distances along streets that are not particularly busy and hence do not have enough demand to establish a station. Some places are restricted by authorities to avoid jamming busy walkways or for security reasons while in other places nearby establishments prohibit youth from forming a station close to their business or office. The youth typically prefer the stationed businesses as it has relatively higher security and yield better income but SSCV clusters have usually a size of 6-10 persons and existing members do not allow expansion of the cluster once it reaches a certain size 19. There are also those youth who settle on some spots alone or with one or two other friends but a sizable station has not yet been formed because of lack of demand. These youth are not exactly mobile but their work place does not have the recognition of the larger stations. Table 42 shows the number of youth in each type of work station status.

Table 42 Distribution of youth by different kinds of work station status

	Addis Ababa				Hawassa		
	Male Female Total		Male	Female	Temale Total		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Mobile youth	3	42	13	25	47	30	
Stationed: Small cluster (1-3 youth)	37	39	38	37	35	37	
Stationed: larger cluster (> 3 youth)	60	18	50	37	18	33	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N(Total Observation/sample)	(111)	(38)	(149)	(225)	(68)	(293)	

Source: Own survey data

In Addis Ababa, most of the youth in SSCV work in larger clusters while in Hawassa there is a more equal proportion in each type of grouping. In both Addis Ababa and Hawassa, young men are less likely to work as mobile youth while young women are more likely to work as mobile youth or in small cluster<sup>20</sup>than in large clusters. Table 43 shows the monthly income obtained by youth in each type of work station.

1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Exceptions are very large public transportation centers in Addis where dozens of SSCVs could be found. But these are few centers across Addis Ababa

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> More than 93% of female youth are coffee makers. Coffee makers take spots among shoe shiners. We have not seen clusters of coffee makers alone. Typically one coffee maker is found in each cluster except in very few cases in Addis Ababa where there are very large clusters of SSCV with more than two coffee makers. These large clusters are located in and around central public transportation hubs.

Table 43 Monthly income from SSCV disaggregated by work station status and city/town

	Addis Ababa				Hawassa	
Work station status	Mean	Median	N	Mean	Median	N
Mobile youth	947	900	19	541	500	89
Stationed: Small cluster (1-3 youth)	1119	1000	56	761	750	108
Stationed larger cluster (> 3 youth)	1323	1250	74	1015	900	96
Total	1198	1200	149	778	750	293

As we see on Table 43, youth in stationed SSCV earn better than mobile youth. And those stationed in larger clusters earn more than those in small clusters. This confirms that there is an entry barrier for stationed SSCV.

As indicated earlier, access to stationed SSCV may be difficult for those stations that have reached a maximum size. While some youth may be able to establish their own station, others have to use their networks and other means to obtain access to a work space. Individual workstations may be easier to establish in areas with little demand. To explore this, we asked youth how they obtained the spot where they have based their business. The results are reported in Table 44.

Table 44 Work establishment of business at current location, how was the spot obtained?

	Male	Female	Total
	%	%	%
Identified spot and set up	48	63	52
Transfer from friend/relative	28	8	23
Bought from another person	0	1	0
Obtain a spot with permission from existing station occupants	15	19	16
Other	9	8	9
N (Total Observation)	(338)	(106)	(444)

Source: Own survey data. The table gives number of responses and percentages of column total.

The table shows that female youth setting up a coffee business faced more of an open access situation as 63% of them were just able to identify a spot and then set up their business. But as we have seen earlier they are often stationed alone or in smaller clusters. 28% of the male youth

got the spot transferred from a friend against only 8% of the girls doing so. But street coffeevending is not an as widely spread activity as shoe shining, that most of the young men are engaged in. In addition, coffee vending is a newer and fast spreading activity that has not yet reached to the same level of competition and therefore face fewer restrictions.

## 7.4 Urban tenure security 1 : Housing for youth in SSCV

Migrants typically live in rented housing. As Table 45 shows, 90% of the migrants in informal self-employment live in rented housing. More than three-quarters of the youth who live in rented housing report that they live in shared units, often with friends (50%) and relatives (33%)

**Table 45 Housing for youth in SSCV** 

Tenancy type	Freq.	Percent
Owned	8	1.8
Rented	401	90.1
Live legally for free	25	5.6
Squat-house	3	0.7
Squat-other shelter	5	1.1
Others	3	0.7
Total	445	100

Source: Own data from survey of youth in Addis Ababa and Hawassa

More than half of the youth migrants are tenure insecure and fear eviction without any fault of theirs. This may be due to lack of signed contracts and clear binding agreements, which is a characteristic of most individual land renting arrangements in urban areas. We see (Table 46) that proportionately more female youth fear eviction than male youth, indicating that women are even more vulnerable in terms of housing. Our econometric analysis indicates that youth who have strong social capital feel less tenure insecure while the length of time one lives in the city or town did not improve the sense of tenure security.

Table 46 Youth's sense of tenure insecurity (fear of no fault eviction from rented house)

	Fear eviction (%)	Do not fear eviction (%)	Total (N)
Male	52	48	311
Female	66	34	90
Total	55	45	401

Source: Own data from survey of youth in Addis Ababa and Hawassa

Table 47 looks further at factors associated with housing tenure insecurity. For male youth with more close relatives the tenure insecurity is lower. This could be because close relatives help with housing. For female youth with more relatives we see no significant reduction in tenure insecurity but female youth with more trusted persons even appear to feel more tenure insecure. Better education was associated with perception of less tenure insecurity for both females and males while tenure insecurity is increasing with age for male youth. There were also differences between the ethnic groups. Sidama females were more tenure insecure while Sidama males were less tenure insecure. Oromo and Guraghe males were also less tenure insecure as compared to Wollaita males.

Table 47 Factors associated with housing tenure insecurity

	Full san	nple	Male s	ample	Female sa	ample
_	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z
Addis Ababa dummy	050	0.080	015	0.435	126	0.175
Number of trusted persons	.0005	0.881	004	0.155	.024	0.009
Years stayed in current location	004	0.330	0003	0.967	003	0.674
Close relatives, number	008	0.211	026	0.000	003	0.453
Distant relatives, number	004	0.528	.008	0.452	015	0.160
Number of friends	.002	0.563	0007	0.804	003	0.900
Number of acquaintances	.0001	0.322	.0001	0.321	.0001	0.817
Age	.012	0.007	.015	0.070	.009	0.386
Gender	.090	0.127				
Birth rank	.001	0.875	0006	0.917	.009	0.630
Years of completed schooling	032	0.000	028	0.000	036	0.042
Have a child	.110	0.000	.043	0.771	.077	0.211
Ethnic group, base=Wollaita						
Sidama	.003	0.843	061	0.000	.230	0.000
Guraghe	144	0.000	198	0.000	.011	0.879
Amhara	015	0.726	.048	0.195	065	0.375
Oromo	296	0.000	444	0.000	106	0.288
Other	051	0.000	091	0.001	096	0.025
Constant	0.110	0.546	-0.005	0.992	0.407	0.590
Number of observations	432		332		100	

Source: Own survey data. The dependent variable is a dummy for fear of being evicted from current housing. The table gives average marginal effects and P-values for significance level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering, with clustering on ethnic group.

## 7.5 Urban tenure security 2: Work place recognition and registration

Whether youth work as a stationed SSCV or a mobile one, their tenure security is limited with regard to eviction or displacement. When there is a road expansion, area development or any other construction that result in displacement of SSCV, there is no mechanism to provide them with an alternative place to work. However, as indicated earlier, stationed youth in SSCV have a *de facto* recognized place of work while the more mobile youth often move from place to place looking for work. Those working in large stations are considered to have a permission to work there and will neither be chased away nor threatened by individuals and businesses. But for the mobile youth who are continuously moving and those who temporarily settle on some spots, the permissibility of their work depends on the specific time and place. Sometimes and in some

places they are tolerated and work without any interference and other times they are chased by police or security guards. This makes their livelihood very risky and volatile.

Recently a new system is introducing a more formal recognition of the work place through a registration of the workstations by an official body, although the objective of the registration is not to give formal recognition to SSCV activities. In Addis Ababa, the registration is done by the neighbourhood security branch of the police. The main purpose of the registration is to fight crime and keep order. The police provides some training to the youth through workshops to create awareness on neighbourhood security and the youth are expected to cooperate with the police on crime and security issues in and around their location. All youth stationed in a place are registered whether or not they belong to large clusters or are single individuals or pairs. The main criterion is that they have a known station at the time of the registration. Youth members in each registered SSCV station are expected to report and register any additional member they would like to admit in that cluster. No other unregistered individual is supposed to base his or her work in and around that place. New individuals are thus able to register if the existing youth are willing to allow them to work in their area and facilitate their registration. Typically this involves strong social networks that are established through family relations or friendship. The police issues no formal work permit or ID card but in some places require the youth to put on a kind of uniform that allows them to be identified. This registration may provide them with a stronger claim to their work place which hitherto has been tacitly recognized. But other than this, youth obtain no other benefit; their activity is still not considered a business and their work place is not eligible for replacement or compensation if needed for public use or is leased to other businesses.

There is a similar mechanism in Hawassa that also focuses on registering stationed youth and collaborating with them on crime prevention and reporting to local authorities. But the registration in Hawassa differs from that of Addis Ababa in ways that makes it more favorable to the youth. The registration is carried out by the kebelle<sup>21</sup> administration instead of the police. The kebelle body that registers these youth encourages the registered clusters to establish local associations/clubs. The group's working place is recognized and a badge is issued to members to identify them as working and belonging there. Other than the badge they are not issued with any formal documentation that they are organized and registered. Although they are not allowed to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia similar to municipality.

set up any structure such as house or shade, they will not be chased by individuals or other groups. Members are given training not only about crime prevention but also about the benefits of saving and they are linked with microfinance institutions which provide them with saving and credit services. Those who do not have residential IDs are issued with IDs in their respective *kebelles*. The youth believe that they benefit from this arrangement in terms of access to microfinance and in terms of better protection from the police and administration. But the system seems to limit the dynamic adjustment as newcomers cannot be included unless another member is leaving the activity. In addition, youth who are not working in a big cluster and mobile youth are not included. Table 48 presents the youth who reported that they have been registered/organized.

Table 48 Registration of street based self-employment by authorities

Percent of youth in SSCV registered neighbourhood security or kebelle						kebelle
	City/town				Gender	
Registered	Addis Ababa	Hawassa	Total	Male	Female	Total
No	63.8	71.2	68.7	63.0	86.8	68.7
Yes	36.2	28.81	31.3	37.0	13.2	31.3
Total (observations)	149	295	444	338	106	444

Source: Own survey data.

Close to one-third of the youth are registered and organized as an association through this mechanism. Proportionately more youth in Addis Ababa have registered in an association than in Hawassa. Female youth are much less likely than male youth to get registered and organized. This is not surprising, however, 93% of the young women work as coffee vendors and coffee vendors almost never cluster as a group like the shoe shiners. The majority of the coffee makers are stationed alone (46%) or with one or two shoe shiners (37%) and hence do not have the recognition of the larger stationed clusters.

While only 8% of the youth report no major challenge in their self-employment activity, the rest identified various factors as important challenges and concerns. The most commonly mentioned concern of the youth is lack of job security and reliability, which is reported by 36% of the them. This is followed by inability to earn enough income from current employment to meet their regular food, shelter and clothing needs (30%).

#### 7.6 Dynamics in youth livelihood

Following the theoretical and empirical literature discussed earlier, we want to investigate whether the migrant youth seeks to move out of the informal self-employment they are engaged in, and if they do, the factors that influence their ambitions and decisions. Table 49 shows the employment transitions youth migrants plan to make. The majority of the youth seeks to move out of the informal self-employment they are engaged in. Proportionately more male youth (81%) want to leave their current informal self-employment than female youth (68%). Unlike the prediction from the neoclassical theory of migration, but in line with the empirical findings in India and Latin America, the informal self-employment in Ethiopian urban areas does not seem to be a waiting stage to a formal wage employment. The table clearly shows that the majority of the youth who wants to change occupation are planning to pursue business rather than seek formal wage employment.

Table 49 Planned occupational change by youth in the informal sector

Occupation/Employment	Female	Male
Occupation/Employment	%	%
Stay on same job/transit to similar job	32.1	18.9
Further study	1.9	7.1
Transit to skilled/professional job	1.9	4.1
Driver	1.9	11.5
Establish own business	62.3	58.4
Number of youth (observation)	(106)	(339)

Source: Own survey data

Proportionately more female youth plan self-employment than male youth, while the male youth have more diversified choice on occupational transition. A second popular occupational move is working as a driver. While working as a driver may not need very large investment, the training costs are substantial and there is a minimum educational level requirement to sit for exam. Of those who indicated that they want to move to a better occupation than their current employment, including for further education, 83 % reported that they are taking concrete steps to achieve their planned objective. However, we did not collect data on the detailed actions they are taking.

<sup>+</sup> Current street based informal self-employment is not considered own business.

#### 7.6.1 Determinants of transition out of informal self-employment

We estimated a multinomial model to analyze factors that explain youth decisions to improve their occupation. We group youth's planned occupation into four groups: 1) Remain in the same informal self-employment or transit to similar activity, 2) Pursue (further) education as main activity, 3) Engage in skilled and professional employment, and 4) Start own business. The first category is used as a base outcome.

The first set of variables we included are age, gender, education and marital status of the youth. These factors reflect the preference as well as the capacity of youth to aspire to a better occupation relative to staying in the same occupation and moving to a similar one. Controlling for other endowments, we expect that younger youth will be more likely to aspire for occupational change because they have a better potential than older youth to develop the necessary skill, knowledge and capital with less pressure to settle on their current job and livelihood. The effect of marriage on the probability of changing an occupation is ambiguous. On the one hand, we can argue that there is perhaps more pressure on married people to aspire to better paying occupations since they may have family responsibility. On the other hand, the same family responsibility may impose budgetary and time constrains and make them less able and likely to accumulate financial and human capital and less willing to take risk. We included gender to test whether young women are less likely to change occupation than young men. In terms of preference for change of occupation, we do not see an argument why young women would have less aspiration to change occupation than young men once we control for their endowment. But given the fact that young migrant women are perhaps less outgoing than young migrant men, they may have less information and confidence that is needed to change to better occupation. To control at least part of this effect we included an interaction variable between gender and education which tests whether young women with more education behave differently.

The needs and capacities of parents and relatives who live in the migrants' origin is likely to affect the decision of youth in urban areas through the incentive and capacity effects. We included two variables to account for these effects. One is parents' land holdings. Higher farm size may indicate that parents are wealthier and may not need help from youth in the city or may even help them in transiting to better employment. Alternatively, higher farm size may imply that the youth have better opportunity to go back to farming and may not want to advance further

in the non-farm sector in urban areas, especially if the migration is temporary. Another variable is an indicator which takes the value one if the youth is the eldest in the household. Controlling for household endowments, we expect the eldest youth to have more responsibility and thus may be less likely to save enough to change occupation or to take a risk of taking up a new job. We also included ethnicity as the cultural context may be relevant in forming the aspirations of the youth.

The results are reported in Table 50. Most of the results are consistent with our expectations. The coefficient on age shows that young age is important for choosing further education and skilled/professional work. Controlling for current level of education, older youth are less likely to choose further education than staying in their current employment. The coefficient is highly statistically significant. Age is also negatively correlated with skilled and professional work although the statistical significance is lower. Similarly, married youth are less likely to go for further education and skilled/professional employment. It may be the case that the early sacrifices needed during study and training for skilled/professional jobs discourage youth who have family responsibility and hence cannot afford to take time in unpaid education or training. At the same time, they are more likely to seek work as a driver. This may be because one may obtain a driving license while engaged in current employment and can look for work without leaving the existing job. In fact, most shoe shiners work close to taxi and bus stations and are in frequent contact with other drivers. The current level of education variable is significant only for choice of skilled/professional job. As expected, those who have relatively more education are more likely to seek skilled/professional job than stay in their current employment. It is interesting to note that, controlling for age, the current level of education did not affect the aspiration for further education.

Young women are less likely than young men to change occupation. And this is true for all occupations. However, education increases the likelihood of young women's aspirations of changing their current occupation. With better education, young women may expect better opportunities to obtain another job and they may develop confidence and be better informed about opportunities. Youth who came from better-off households in terms of larger farm size are more likely to go for skill/professional work and establish own business indicating that the capacity of parents translate into better potential for the youth. Wealthier households are more

likely to provide financial support necessary to get the relevant training for skilled/professional job and capital for business as well as the safety net in case of failure. Youth who came from better off households also have less financial responsibility and are thus more able to save.

Years of residence in the city did not affect the occupational choice of youth. But network is found to be important for choice of skilled/professional job and for working as a driver. Youth who have three or more friends and relatives in the city are more likely to choose professional job and driving than those who have two or fewer friends and relatives. This shows the importance of network in landing good jobs in urban areas. Medium level network is also significant for establishing own business but the significance is weak.

Ethnicity was important only for establishing own business. Compared to other ethnic groups, the Guraghes and the Wollaitas (accounting for 70% of the youth) are more likely to start up own business while the Sidama are less likely to start business. The correlation is not statistically very strong for these ethnic differences which were significant at 10% level only. Compared to youth in Addis Ababa, youth migrants in Hawassa are less likely to seek employment as a driver and to establish own business. This has perhaps to do with the limited demand in Hawassa for drivers and small businesses relative to Addis Ababa where the opportunities in both counts are vast in comparison.

Table 50 Multinomial model estimation of determinants of transition out of informal self-employment

	Further Study		Skille	Skilled/Professional		Wo	Work as a driver		Establish busines		usiness	
			Robust			Robust			Robust			Robus
	Coeff.		Std.Err	Coeff.		Std.Err	Coeff.		Std.Err	Coeff.		Std.Er
Age	-0.217	****	0.060	-0.091	*	0.050	-0.091		0.063	0.006		0.023
Married	-12.367	****	0.721	-12.531	****	0.948	2.328	****	0.360	0.438		0.294
Education (in years)	-0.009		0.090	0.266	***	0.086	-0.009		0.074	0.034		0.050
Female youth	-5.292	****	1.420	-8.903	****	0.878	-8.576	****	0.860	-1.327	*	0.787
Female X Education	0.556	****	0.155	0.765	****	0.095	0.757	****	0.128	0.113		0.106
Parents' land size <sup>+</sup>	0.086		0.078	0.159	****	0.039	0.033		0.057	0.110	***	0.035
Youth is the eldest	-0.517		0.465	-0.377		0.548	0.157		0.326	0.011		0.132
Years of city residence	-0.040		0.059	0.031		0.028	-0.029		0.032	0.042	*	0.024
Network: Baseline: Less	than 3 rei	latives a	nd friends									
Network2: 3-7 people	0.333		0.860	0.942	****	0.278	1.063	***	0.390	0.454	*	0.248
Network3: >=7 people	0.112		0.611	1.780	****	0.483	0.810	*	0.418	0.050		0.369
Ethnicity: Baseline= Ot	hers											
Wollaita	-0.118		0.856	-0.546		0.998	0.416		0.431	0.335	*	0.176
Guraghe	0.175		1.069	-0.628		0.961	-0.572		0.643	0.549	*	0.305
Sidama	-1.021		0.885	-0.885		0.812	0.433		0.456	-0.256	*	0.143
Hawassa City	-0.740		0.524	-0.131		0.537	-0.888	**	0.391	-1.014	****	0.295
Constant	3.627		2.430	-2.442	**	1.238	0.703		0.980	0.589		0.697
Prob > chi2	0.000											
Loglikelihood	-447.27											
Number of Obs.	442											

Note: The reference livelihood strategy (base outcome) is staying in current employment or transit to similar informal self-employment. Significance levels: \*: 10%, \*\*\*: 1%, \*\*\*\*: 0.1%.

<sup>+</sup> Parents' land size is given per capita of siblings who live with the parents to account for wealth/poverty condition and inheritance possibility

## 7.6.2 Participation in savings and credit groups ('Equb')

For young men and women engaged in the informal sector who aspire to change occupation, one of the first steps to take is to build their financial capital. This is especially true if they wanted to establish business or obtain education and training. In Addis Ababa and Hawassa, the availability of several banks with different services make saving and capital accumulation easier. But even for those who have a bank account, participation in a savings and credit group has its advantages: 1) participants have access to an agreed capital amount before all of it is saved up; 2) once youth is engaged in 'equb', it will be a forced saving until the rotation is complete; 3) youth who have no resident ID and hence could not obtain a bank account in the informal banking sector will be able to save in these groups; 4) the 'equb' members become members of social networks that open access to other resources.

Table 51 Participation in savings and credit groups (equb)

	G	Gender			
Are you member of equb?	Male	Female	Both		
Yes %	50	26	44		
If yes, how much saved per month	451	543	463		

Source: Own survey data.

About 50% of the males an about 27% of the females participate in a credit and savings group. The gender difference in participation may be associated with lack of credit network for the young women or lack of ability to save. As we have seen earlier, most of the young women are married and have family which will put pressure on their budget. On average, participating youth save 463 Birr per month. This is a very high level of saving since it accounts for 45% of the monthly income for savers. Participating female youth save on average more than male youth.

We assess further factors associated with the participation in such groups using a probit model that estimates the probability of participating in the credit association. Table 52 reports the results. The table shows some clear gender differences. Male youth membership in *equb* is strongly positively associated with them being organized in an association while we see no such correlation for female youth. For male youth *equb* membership is also positively associated with the number of trusted persons they have while it is negatively associated with their age and

positively associated with their number of years of schooling while none of these variables were significant for female youth. Again there were significant ethnic differences and male youth from Wollaita were significantly more likely to participate in *equb* than the male youth from the other ethnic groups. For female youth the Guraghe and Oromo were less likely to participate than the others.

Table 52 Factors associated with membership in savings organization (equb), probit models

	Full sample		Male san	Male sample		mple
	dy/dx $P>z$ $dy/dx$ $P>z$		dy/dx	P>z		
Organized in association	.189	0.000	.237	0.000	.073	0.655
Addis Ababa dummy	.012	0.776	014	0.573	.088	0.158
Number of trusted persons	.025	0.065	.032	0.042	.007	0.566
Years stayed in current location	0006	0.931	006	0.554	.0007	0.945
Close relatives, number	.004	0.539	.006	0.359	.002	0.858
Distant relatives, number	0001	0.985	006	0.470	.005	0.477
Number of friends	001	0.470	0007	0.667	.015	0.240
Number of acquaintances	0001	0.503	0002	0.207	.00001	0.960
Age	013	0.001	017	0.029	007	0.407
Gender	109	0.143				
Birth rank	003	0.789	003	0.820	002	0.930
Years of completed schooling	.006	0.246	.015	0.000	007	0.529
Ethnic group, base=Wollaita						
Sidama	105	0.000	068	0.040	165	0.079
Guraghe	170	0.000	123	0.009	228	0.000
Amhara	210	0.000	434	0.000	013	0.714
Oromo	132	0.000	166	0.010	099	0.015
Other	.042	0.045	.096	0.000	140	0.026
Constant	0.454	0.115	0.519	0.223	-0.070	0.920
Number of observations	440		336		104	

Source: Own survey data. The table gives average marginal effects and P-values for significance level. In the model with female youth one of the ethnic group dummies ("Others") predicted perfectly and was excluded from the regression. Standard errors are corrected for clustering, with clustering on ethnic group.

## 7.7 Social network and social safety net for SSCV youth

The social network of the youth migrants in our SSCV youth sample is assessed as on their responses to a number of our questions. Table 53 reports the number of people in the social network of the migrant. The average number of trusted people in this sample similar to that for tracked you, although the mean number for the different types of network appear smaller for this sample.

Table 53 Type of network youth have in urban areas

	Number of individuals in the network				
Relation	Mean	Std.Err	Median	Max	
Close relatives	2.4	0.198	1	40	
Distant relatives	2.3	0.230	0	30	
Friends	4.1	0.299	3	100	
Acquaintances	56.0	5.448	20	1000	
Total people in network closer					
to acquaintance	8.9	0.506	6	122	
Trusted persons	2.1	0.248	1	100	

We now look at factors associated with youth SSCV migrants' number of trusted persons. The explanatory variables we included in the estimation are; how many close and distant relatives they have, their number of friends and acquaintances, their age, gender, birth rank, education and ethnicity. We run separate models for males and females as different factors may be important for each of them.

We see from Table 54 that number of close relatives is important for female youth but not for male youth while more distant relatives and acquaintances appear more important for male youth while birth rank is important for both groups, those with higher birth rank also appear to have more trusted persons. There were also significant differences between the ethnic groups with Wollaita male youth apparently having more trusted persons than the Sidama, Guraghe and Amhara. This could be because they dominate in the shoe shiner market and operate in groups there. Guraghe and Amhara female youth also have more trusted persons than female youth from other ethnic groups.

Table 54 Factors associated with number of trusted persons the youth SSCV operators have

	Full sample		Male	Male sample		Female sample	
	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	
Years stayed in current location	0.044	0.406	0.062	0.371	.011	0.766	
Close relatives, number	0.077	0.068	-0.026	0.424	.099	0.017	
Distant relatives, number	0.094	0.225	0.120	0.086	.023	0.456	
Number of friends	0.088	0.182	0.045	0.380	.104	0.165	
Number of acquaintances	0.001	0.014	0.002	0.025	.0002	0.921	
Age	-0.066	0.222	-0.023	0.637	126	0.066	
Gender	-0.676	0.148					
Birth rank	0.042	0.212	0.042	0.229	.113	0.000	
Years of completed schooling	0.035	0.246	0.069	0.140	030	0.242	
Ethnic group, base=Wollaita							
Sidama	-0.592	0.000	-0.672	0.000	.155	0.497	
Guraghe	-0.717	0.000	-0.947	0.000	.603	0.007	
Amhara	0.132	0.677	-0.817	0.000	1.541	0.000	
Oromo	-0.718	0.045	-0.607	0.322	.110	0.660	
Other	-0.387	0.028	-0.868	0.000	.282	0.357	
Constant	0.769	0.425	0.460	0.294	1.094	0.724	
Lnalpha constant	-0.723	0.001	-0.759	0.001	-2.065	0.050	
Number of observations	441		337		104		

Source: Own survey data. Estimates from negative binomial models. The table gives average marginal effects and P-values for significance level.

## 8 Overall Discussion and Recommendations

This section provides a summary of the research findings in this report. We organize the discussion in such a way that each sub-section answers separately the detailed research questions we set out to investigate.

# 8.1 Why do youth migrate to urban areas? What kinds of youth are more likely to migrate?

The 75 youth we have tracked from the villages in Oromia and SNNP regions in southern Ethiopia now live in 31 urban centers across Ethiopia. The majority of them left their village with the aim of gaining more education in urban areas or for employment purposes. However, only a small minority (13%) plans to go back to their village while the rest are either already settled or want to permanently settle in their current location of residence or in another town or city. This indicates that education-related migration is an entry point to urban livelihood, which allows youth to accumulate human capital that will enable them to obtain employment in the urban sector where they finally settle.

Our econometric analysis of migration that is based on the pre-migration sample of households and individual data collected from the village shows that education is a very strong driver of migration. Youth who have advanced in their education in the village are more likely to migrate to urban areas. This is to be expected since education brings information about opportunities outside of one's immediate surroundings and raises expectations for a better life, thereby encouraging youth to explore new opportunities. Youth with better level of education may expect to have better chance of getting employment in urban areas. In addition, controlling for age, youth with more education in the village are more likely to want to advance in their education. There are no colleges or universities in these villages and no school beyond 10<sup>th</sup> grade in most of them.

Youth who belong to households with older household head are more likely to migrate. This may reflect that the parental control grows weaker, encouraging interested youth to migrate, or that with the household head getting older, there is more need for additional income from migration. Youth migration is negatively correlated with household wealth showing that youth from poorer households have more incentive to migrate to urban areas. Youth in Arsi Negelle (West Arsi) and Damot Sore (Wollaita) are more likely to migrate to urban areas than stay in the village.

Farming in Damot Sore is subsistence oriented and farm size in the area is very small. While farms in Arsi Negelle are, on average, larger than those in other areas, some of the villages have been food insecure in the past, indicating poorer performance of agriculture and is a push factor for migration.

## 8.2 How do youth chose their destination of migration?

According to the 75 tracked youth migrants, the most important criterion for choosing the first destination of migration is school convenience which was reported by 41% of the youth. This is followed by better expected livelihood (20%). Interestingly, cultural and language similarity is unimportant with only 2 individuals mentioning these as the most important factor to choose a destination. For those who are still planning to move further, better livelihood option is the most commonly cited criterion (35%), followed by settling close to the village of origin (30%). The picture we get is thus that youth who travel to cities and towns select places that have the most affordable and accessible schools to build human capital and then settle in urban centers closer to their origin.

It can be reasonably assumed that rural youth may not migrate long distances in their first migration since they may lack information, capital, network and experience. Our study finds that youth do migrate in steps rather than move directly to their envisioned city of settlement. The data from our tracked youth survey shows that 60% of the youth have migrated to another town before their current residence. Close to 30% have been to more than one town before their current residence. In addition, slightly more than half of the youth (53%) plan to move forward to another town.

The average monetary cost of migration is about 757 Birr. But there is variation in the costs depending on the distance, the needs of the individual, availability of networks, capacity of the migrant or parents to cover more comfortable migration and other factors. For about 10% of the youth the cost is 50 Birr or less while for the 10% in the other end the cost is 2700 Birr and more. The youth from Oromia region report higher costs of migration than the youth from

SNNP region<sup>22</sup>. But it appears that having a network significantly reduces the costs of migration with those without network spending double the migration expenditure.

## 8.3 How is the life for the migrants in the urban areas?

The majority of tracked youth are engaged in education (36%) or professional salaried work (28%) as their primary occupation. Close to 20% are engaged in low-level wage or self-employment, 11% in own business and skilled wage employment and 7% are unemployed. Three-fourth of the youth lives in rented housing with the majority of these (75%) sharing rented units and the costs. About 40% of the youth who live in rented housing are tenure insecure and fear that they could be evicted without any fault of theirs.

While there are few youth who have no one they would call a friend, relative or an acquaintance in their current town, most have developed some social network capital at their migration destination. The average migrant in the tracked youth sample has about four friends, nine relatives and more than five dozen acquaintances. But the number of people trusted is fewer with an average of two trusted persons. In a country where formal social welfare services are missing, informal family, friends and other networks provide the safety net in times of unemployment and loss of income. Our survey shows that about 70% of the tracked youth can rely on relatives and friends to provide them with food and shelter in case of loss of employment and income while for 30% there is no such protection. For those youth with some protection, the provision of food and shelter ranges from one week to 108 weeks with an average of 25 weeks for food and 26 months for shelter.

Whether or not youth maintain the relationship with their relatives in the village, the strength and the type of their relationship will have some effect on the success of the migrant as well as the burden he/she might carry. Our investigation of the relationship of the migrant with their family back in the village starts with a question on whether they obtained land inheritance. A quarter of the youth have already received land while an additional 46% expect to inherit land sometime in the future. Those who did not receive land nor expect to receive any in the future account for 28%. More than two-third of the youth reported that they are able to go back to the village and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Because the 75 youth were interviewed in large number of cities and town (more than 30), we cannot meaningfully disaggregate cost by destination.

obtain a livelihood there if they wanted to. Interestingly, we find the same belief among youth regardless of whether or not the youth has access to agricultural land through their inheritance from the family. This is perhaps an indication that the migrant youth in urban areas are envisioning primarily non-farm based livelihood if they return to rural areas.

The majority of the youth in this sample kept contact with their relatives in the village. More than 90% had some interaction with parents or siblings through phone or physical visits during the last one year. There are also flows of remittances that go in both directions. 49% of the migrated youth receive in-kind or monetary remittances from their relatives in the village and 43% sent remittances to their village. Some of these youth are both receivers and senders of remittances. The highest transfer from rural areas is made to unemployed youth and students. Note that students, half of whom are in college, account for one-third of the tracked youth. Of those youth who sent remittances, 35% revealed that they sent money to the family back home without being asked. The reasons they gave for doing so were "I know they need it" (62%), "to please them" (29%), and "it makes me happy" (9%). Both the two-way flow of resources and the motives for sending remittances indicate that youth and relatives in the village support each other according to their abilities and needs rather than according to a certain a priori expectation of a remittance flow from urban to rural areas. This figure needs to be viewed with caution, however, because the tracked youth may not be representative of typical migrants as we were able to track them by collecting their address and contact information from their relatives in the village. The fact that we were able to track them indicates that they are better connected to their rural origin. Larger and diversified data is needed, however, to make a more generalized statement about this.

## 8.4 Youth assessment of migration experience

At the beginning of life in a new town, place to stay, employment and money for sustenance are stated as the three most pressing issues by the youth. Once they are settled, money for sustenance remains as the most pressing problem. Integration with locals is of little concern even at the early days in the new city.

Youth seem to have quite realistic expectations about life in urban areas before they arrive there. Comparing their expectation and their experience in urban areas, the majority of the tracked youth felt that security, integration with locals and finding friends were as good as expected or

better than expected while cost of living was worse than expected for half of the youth. With regard to their health situation, we found that the majority of the youth were healthy before migration and their health remain stable after migration.

Overall, the majority of the youth are happy with their urban life. Two-third of them indicated that they are satisfied or very satisfied with their life in urban areas. While 23% of youth were dissatisfied with their life in their current town, only 16% of all youth in the tracked sample regretted their decision to migrate.

## 8.5 Youth in informal self-employment

The migration literature suggests that urban migrants who are attracted to cities and towns due to higher wage in the formal sector may end up in a low-paying informal sector since there is more labor supply to the 'modern sector' than there is labor demand to absorb it all. We thus tried to examine youth involvement in the informal sector using a sample of youth who are engaged in street-based self-employment that involves shoe shining and coffee-vending (SSCV). Most of the youth who are engaged in SSCV also carry out additional activities as a side business, such as selling small merchandises, car washing, working as casual porter, etc. This makes for an ideal choice of sample to analyze informal youth self-employment among migrated youth for three reasons; 1) Most of those engaged in SSCV are young migrants coming from rural areas; 2) The sector is more or less homogenous and this makes analysis of behavior, such as occupational transition and aspiration, easier to deal with; and 3) Many migrants are attracted to the sector because of its' low entry barrier. The city and town covered under the survey are Addis Ababa and Hawassa. We used stratified random sampling in Addis Ababa to include samples from all parts of the city. In Hawassa we surveyed all youth in the main streets of the town. We have a total of 445 youth in this combined sample.

We found that 98.4% of the youth surveyed in SSCV activities were migrants confirming the informal observation that migrants are attracted to these kinds of self-employment. Although migrants came from four of the regions of Ethiopia, the overwhelming majority came from SNNP. Migrants from SNNP account for as much as 94% of all in the SSCV sample in Hawassa and 84% in Addis Ababa. Within SNNP, youth from the Wollaita and Guraghe zones account for the lion share (80%) of the sample. While SNNP in general and the two zones in particular have

higher population pressure and poorer agricultural potential that might be important push factors, there are other areas of the country that may have as much or worse problems that are not so disproportionately represented. The migration literature indicates that segmentation of migration streams is very common and the poorest areas may not have the highest rate of out-migration. Access to infrastructure, group migration, networking, and information from earlier migrants are also important factors that may facilitate more migration from some places than others. It is striking though that the high share of outmigration from the Wollaita zone has happened within a period of five years while there was very little outmigration before that. This appears to be a threshold effect as there is only so much people that can be sustained based on an agricultural livelihood as population size continues to rise and land per capita diminishes rapidly. More rural areas in Ethiopia are likely to reach this threshold level in the years to come as rural population growth continues to be high.

The majority of the youth migrants in this sample (77%) were male. Except in few cases, male and female youth specialize in different activities. The male youth are primarily engaged in shoe shining while the women are primarily engaged in coffee vending. The average migrant youth is a young adult at the age of 22 years. Female youth in SSCV are older and more likely to be married than male youth. Youth in SSCV do not have much education. More than half of the young men and women never reached beyond the sixth grade. However, the proportion of young women with no education (19%) is much higher than that for young men (3%) and the average education of male youth is higher than that of female youth.

Although the SSCV is an informal self-employment that is based on business on the street, finding a space to work is a major constraint. We found that there are two types of SSCV, particularly with regard to shoe shining activities. In a stationed SSCV, youth have a designated area where individuals have a *de facto* recognized spot to set up their business. The work area is generally protected from other individuals who want to set up a business there. Youth in the mobile SSCV business on the other hand carry their materials in a small parcel or box and move from place to place looking for customers. They work in places that have demand but are restricted from stationed SSCV or they walk long distances along streets that are not particularly busy and hence do not have much demand. The youth typically prefer the stationed businesses as it has relatively higher security and reliability but SSCV clusters have usually a size of 6-10

persons and existing members do not allow expansion of the cluster once it reaches a certain size. Whether youth work as a stationed SSCV or a mobile one, their tenure security is limited with regard to eviction or displacement since they are informal homesteaders with no formal rights. Still, informal recognition appears to play an important role for shoe shiners who have established their business on a fixed spot. However, when there is a road expansion, area development or any other construction that result in displacement of SSCV, there is no formal mechanism to provide them with an alternative place to work. In a situation with rapid economic growth and city and town expansion there are also opportunities to identify new good spots for homesteading for stationed SSCV.

On average youth earn 920 Birr per month from their self-employment. Approximately 80% of the youth intend to move out of this low paying informal self-employment. However, it appears that male youth have more enthusiasm or capacity to transit out of their current occupation than female youth. Proportionately more female youth (32%) than male youth (19%) stated that they will remain in the same activity. Moreover, the female youth in this sample have lived on average 7.4 years while the male youth in SSCV lived on average 3.8 years in the city/town, indicating that male youth who have lived there longer have already transited out of the SSCV sector. To better understand the mechanism of youth aspiration and decision to transit out of this self-employment we used econometric analysis. We estimated a multinomial model to examine factors associated with their aspiration/plans to move out of the informal self-employment.

Our estimation results show that those who have relatively more education are more likely to seek a skilled/professional job than stay in their current employment, but the youth's current level of education did not affect their aspiration to move from informal self-employment to further education<sup>23</sup>. While we stated that young women are found to be less likely than young men to change occupation, education increases the likelihood that young women change their current occupation. With better education, young women may expect better opportunities to obtain another job and they may develop better confidence and have more information about opportunities. Youth who came from better-off households in terms of larger farm size, are more likely to go for skilled/professional work and establish business indicating that the capacity of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The "further study" here refers to youth choosing to be a student as a primary occupation. It could be at any level of education

parents translate into better capacity for the youth. Wealthier households are more likely to provide financial support necessary for the youth to get the relevant training for skilled/professional jobs and start-up capital for business as well as the safety net in case of failure. Youth who came from better-off households also have less financial responsibility and hence are more able to save. The corollary of this is that youth from poorer households are more likely to be trapped in low-return employment so that even if they escape poverty in the village, they may remain in poverty by joining the urban poor. Age is found to be important for migrants' aspiration. Controlling for current level of education, older youth are less likely to choose further education than staying in their current employment. Age is also negatively correlated with skilled and professional work although the statistical significance is lower. Similarly, married youth are less likely to go for further education and skilled/professional employment. It may be the case that the early sacrifices needed during study and training for skilled/professional job discourage youth who are older and those who have family responsibility as they cannot afford to take time in unpaid education or training. At the same time, they are more likely to seek work as a driver. This may be because one may obtain driving license while engaged in current employment and can look for work without leaving existing job.

## 8.6 Welfare of migrant youth in urban areas

The youth in SSCV are somewhat different from the tracked youth in that all of the youth in SSCV are already engaged in employment while those in the tracked sample includes students (including higher education students), professionally employed youth, youth engaged in low-return activities, and unemployed youth. The average education of the tracked youth is higher and most of them identify education as the primary objective of their first migration. The main element these two groups share is that they are young people that have migrated from villages in rural Ethiopia in search for better education or better livelihood. They face similar vulnerabilities and challenges including tenure insecurity and lack of safety, although the extent of their vulnerabilities may be different.

The youth in low-return self-employment activities seem more vulnerable than the tracked youth. On average 90% of these youth live in rented housing and 75% live in a shared unit. As in the case of tracked youth, the most common reason for choosing their residential neighborhood is proximity to work. But in the case of SSCV youth, price of housing is also important with 30%

of the youth stating it as the main reason for choosing the neighborhood. The percentage of youth who feel housing tenure insecure is higher in the SSCV sample (53%) than in the tracked youth sample. While 70% of the tracked youth have some form of social protection in the case that they lost employment and have no other income or saving, the reverse is true for youth in SSCV. 74% report that they have no such protection. And for those who have access to some protection the length of time they can rely on friends' and relatives' support for food and shelter is much lower, with mean at 11 weeks both for food and shelter.

In terms of migration destination, it appears that the youth prefers Hawassa to Addis Ababa. From the tracked youth migrants who wanted to move to another place, 27% chose Hawassa while only 5% chose Addis Ababa as their next destination. The statistics from the SSCV survey shows that while 81% of the SSCV youth in Addis Ababa want to settle there, compared to a higher percentage (92%) for the youth in Hawassa who want to settle there. This is somewhat surprising since popular beliefs indicate that youth are attracted towards the biggest cities. This data is an indication that smaller towns might see higher rates of youth immigration than the much larger Addis Ababa city. These youth may not be representative of all youth in the country, however, since the tracked youth are originally from villages closer to Hawassa than Addis Ababa and most of the youth in SSCV happen to be from SNNP region.

We suspect that the successfully tracked youth may not be fully representative of the youth migrants from Southern Ethiopia since the sample is small and our inability to track the remaining 75 youth may be related to the life condition and experience of those youth which resulted in them having less contact with their relatives, and hence become less reachable. On the other hand, youth in SSCV represent exclusively self-employed youth. But we think that the analysis of these two data sets jointly give us a reasonably broad insight into youth rural-urban migration experiences in contemporary Ethiopia and their life in the city and towns.

## 9 Conclusions and Recommendations

## 9.1 Conclusion

Rural-urban youth migration is a growing phenomenon. This report examines the experience of youth migrants including their challenges and opportunities using three sets of data that enable a

mapping of youth migration from rural villages in southern Ethiopia to urban centers in the country. We investigate determinants of migration decisions using pre-migration data. We examine migration and self-employment experiences, including challenges faced by migrants, using survey data collected from tracked migrants (at their destination towns) and randomly selected self-employed youth in Addis Ababa and Hawassa. It is possible that our sample does not capture youth that have done too badly in urban areas because we were not able to track all migrant youth from the villages in the sample. But we are confident that the combined data give us enough information and variations to enable us make some generalized observations about youth rural-urban migration in Ethiopia. Our findings are summarized below

## 1. There is significant rural-urban youth migration in Ethiopia, and it is likely to accelerate:

Although rural-urban migration has been historically low in Ethiopia, it is now significant and likely to increase. One-third of the households in our sample in Southern Ethiopia have at least one member that has migrated to urban areas and 21% have at least one youth member who has migrated to urban areas. The increase in farmland scarcity coupled with lack of non-farm employment opportunities in the rural areas are likely to push more youth to the urban areas.

#### 2. Migrant youth do not have similar background and motivation

Our study shows that rural youth from poorer households and from villages with less agricultural potential are more likely to migrate to urban areas pushed by poor livelihood and poverty in rural areas. On the other hand, youth who have better employment opportunities in urban areas such as those with more education migrate to urban areas pulled by better returns to their labor and education.

#### 3. Youth experience tenure insecurity

Migrant youth suffer from tenure insecurity related to rented housing and work place for the informal self-employment. More than 40% of migrant youth report that they fear arbitrary eviction from their rented residence. In addition, for youth engaged in street-based business, lack of tenure security for their work place is one of the major livelihood concerns. These youth suffer from threat of eviction by officials, intimidation and violence by security personnel and competition for the work place by other individuals. A quarter of the youth who are engaged in

street based self-employment report experiencing different kinds of threat or violence such as being chased away, verbal abuse, etc in the one month before the survey. Youth who are evicted from their work place and were never given a substitute spot may lose their livelihood. Because most of these youth (70%) do not have any social security, lack of their work space may soon lead to homelessness unless they are lucky to find other livelihood by themselves.

## 4. Temporary income shocks can make youth food insecure

Migrant youth may be exposed to serious consumption shocks in the event that they lost their employment or income source as there are no formal safety net programs in urban areas. All youth are not equally disadvantage in this regard, however, since some have more informal safety net than others. Among the youth in informal self-employment, 70% have no one that can provide them with food and shelter while among tracked youth only 30% have no such protection. The youth with no social protection are very vulnerable in the cities because they have left their parents and their village where they would have been afforded with a fallback option in times of crisis while in the city there are no formal institutions that provide support for unemployed youth. These youth, thus, risk ending up in the streets with dire consequences for their future and current welfare.

#### 5. Young women seem to be more disadvantaged than their male counterpart.

Young women earn less both in the formal employment, as reported from tracked youth, and in the informal self-employment. They are generally less endowed in resource such as education and that may result in lower earnings. There is also a higher risk that young women are trapped in the low resource, low-income state. Our analysis of decisions to transit out of informal self-employment shows that young men are more likely to aspire for a better occupation than young women. The good news is that education seems to have more impact on the motivation and determination of young women to transit to a better occupation.

6. The migrant youth have generally adjusted well in the cities and make effort to improve their livelihood condition

Our study indicates that the majority of migrants leave their village with reasonable expectations about life in urban areas and they are now generally satisfied with their experience in urban areas. While the conditions of the youth in the informal self-employment are not very

satisfactory, most of them consider it as an entry level job and aspire to transit to better employment such as skilled wage employment, own business and further education. The majority (85%) of the youth indicates that they have started taking concrete steps to achieve their objective of transiting to a better occupation

We see no evidence of conflicts and tension between migrant youth and local communities in the urban areas.

#### 9.2 Recommendations

Our study finds that there is a significant level of out-migration from rural areas of Ethiopia and into different urban centers. The youth in our sample are predominantly engaged in productive employment, including education. While we find that the migrated youth in our sample are generally well adjusted in their new destination, they do face some challenges and vulnerabilities that may have dire consequences. The main issues include: housing and work place tenure insecurity, low human and financial capital and lack of access to social welfare services such as an urban safety net. Below we list some measures that can be taken to address these concerns.

- Building capacity: Migrants face different capacity constraints including lack of access to
  financial capital, information and network as well as insufficient skill and education to
  improve occupation and earning potential. The following steps can be implemented to build
  youth capacity for a better livelihood.
  - Provide access to capital through microfinance institutions.
  - Improve skill through short term technical training that can be made available through evening classes to allow working youth access such training
  - Organize information workshops and trainings that are tailored to youth in the specific
    occupation and neighbourhood. Effort should be made to arrange these trainings at a time
    and place that are suitable to youth and address topics that are relevant for each group.
- 2. Safety net and protection of vulnerable livelihood: Loss of employment, health and housing is very challenging for anyone. But for migrant youth it could be very devastating. They are away from their village and families who otherwise would provide them with the necessary support. Their young age also mean that they may not have significant saving or capable network. Some of the actions local and state actors can do are:

- Design a safety net program in the cities similar to the food-for-work program in rural areas that can be available for youth who lost their livelihood or did not have one yet.
- Design a program that provides food and shelter for youth who are unable to work due to sickness and disability.
- Protect the livelihoods of youth by facilitating credit availability for work-related emergencies

## 3. Improving work place and housing tenure security:

- Setting up a mechanism to strengthen bargaining power of youth in the rental arrangement such as by allowing them to appeal to the *kebelle* administration in the event of arbitrary eviction without notice may help youth's actual and perceived sense of tenure security
- For workplace tenure security, the registration that has started in the two cities we surveyed can be strengthened and expanded to give recognition to self-employed youthand their work place, including for new entrants.
- There should be also a mechanism in place to facilitate youth access to a replacement work place or alternative livelihood when they are evicted from their current work place.
- 4. **Addressing the gendered nature of some youth challenges**: Some of the challenges youth face have a gender dimension and need to be addressed accordingly.
  - Mechanisms to prevent sexual harassment and abuse. Young women in general and those working in the street in particular are vulnerable to sexual harassment which will make it more difficult for them to engage in capacity enhancing activities and put stress on their mental and physical health. A system for support (legal and humanitarian) to female youth who have been exposed to harassment should also be established.
  - Young mothers working on the streets, especially single mothers often bring their children to their work place since there are often no one to take care of them at home. This exposes small children to health and behavioural risks and deprives them of an appropriate playing and learning environment. Whether a young mother can work, where she works and how many hours per day she can work will thus be influenced by the care she can afford to young children. Access to affordable daycare can help young mothers work and earn to provide for the family and improve their livelihood.

- Empowerment of girls and young women. In most parts of rural Ethiopia, young girls and women are often discouraged from asking/claiming their rights, expressing their opinion and leading their work and life with assertiveness. Female migrants may thus find it difficult to improve their livelihood in a fast paced urban environment. Targeted training for girls and young women can boost their confidence and improve their information.
- 5. Protecting youth from health and behavioral risks: Young people are, due to their age and lack of experience, vulnerable to behavioral risks such as delinquency, substance abuse, involvement in gangs, unprotected and multiple sexual relations, etc. Because they are away from their parents and from their village which has been the source of moral guidance and support, these youth need institutional support and guidance. The following activities can help to protect youth:
  - Accessible youth centers where different services including guidance can be provided
  - Provide regular workshops, orientation and entertainments to create and promote awareness
  - Free screening for transmittable diseases such as HIV(Access to free/affordable health care services)

#### 6. Institutional framework:

- Exchange of ideas among towns: Some of the towns may already be managing these issues better than others while some of the bigger towns and Addis Ababa city have more experience with migrants. Exchange of ideas and experiences will enable administrators to come up with good solutions. For example, we have discussed in this report that Hawassa and Addis Ababa started registration of youth in street-based self-employment but the registration in Hawassa is more helpful to the youth.
- A city-wide youth consultation and localized migrant youth consultation may provide important information about the challenges, constraints and priorities of youth and may allow the youth to engage in the process of seeking solutions.

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## **APPENDICES**

Table A 1 Current residence town of tracked youth from Southern Ethiopia

Current youth residence is in the	Home village is in the district of:						
town of:	Shashemen	Arsi Negele	Wondogenet	Wollaita	Total		
Adama	0	2	0	0	2		
Addis Ababa	0	0	0	2	2		
Alemtena	0	1	0	0	1		
Ambo	0	1	0	0	1		
Arba Minch	0	1	0	0	1		
Areka	0	0	0	1	1		
Arsi Nagelle	0	10	0	0	10		
Assela	0	1	0	0	1		
Bahir Dar	0	0	0	1	1		
Debre Tabor	0	1	0	0	1		
Debre Zeyit	0	1	0	0	1		
Debrezeit	0	2	0	0	2		
Dilla	0	1	0	0	1		
Endegagn	0	0	0	1	1		
Gasuba	0	0	0	2	2		
Gununo	0	0	0	6	6		
Harara	0	0	1	0	1		
Hawasssa	0	3	4	6	13		
Humbo	0	0	0	1	1		
Jimma	0	0	0	4	4		
Kore	0	1	0	0	1		
Meki	0	0	0	1	1		
Nekemt	0	1	0	0	1		
Robe	1	0	0	0	1		
Sabata	0	1	0	0	1		
Shashamene	3	3	0	0	6		
Sodo	0	1	0	3	4		
Woldiya	0	0	0	1	1		
Wondo	0	1	0	0	1		
Wondo Genet	0	0	1	0	1		
Ziway	0	3	0	1	4		
Total	4	35	6	30	75		
Not tracked	2	5	3	66	76		

Table A 2 Description of survey areas

Region	District	Farm size	Agriculture	Access to roads and markets	Population
Oromia	Shashemene 4 villages	<ul> <li>Current average holding 1.15ha</li> <li>22% of farms were below 0.5 ha in 2007</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Rain-fed plough         agriculture</li> <li>Cereal producing area</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Town of Shashemene         (growing trade center) located         in the district</li> <li>District lies Along the road         to Addis Ababa and Awassa</li> <li>4 villages at different distance         from town</li> </ul>	- 94% Oromo ethnicity - 98% Muslim
Oromia	Arsi Negelle 4 villages	<ul> <li>Current average</li> <li>holding 1.38ha</li> <li>12% of farms were</li> <li>below 0.5 ha in 2007</li> </ul>	Rain-fed plough     agriculture     Cereal producing area	<ul> <li>District lies along the road to</li> <li>Addis Ababa and Awassa</li> <li>4 villages at different distance from main road</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>92% Oromo ethnicity</li> <li>85% Muslim</li> <li>Food insecure</li> </ul>
Oromia	Wondo Oromia 2 villages	<ul> <li>Current average holding 0.84 ha</li> <li>This sample was part of Shashemene district in 2007</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Perennial zone</li><li>Plough and hoe</li></ul>	Geographically close to     Wondo Genet -Sidama	<ul> <li>97% Oromo ethnicity</li> <li>79% Muslim</li> <li>18% Protestant</li> <li>A new district composed of communities from Sidama and Oromia zones</li> </ul>
SNNP	Wondo Genet (Sidama) 3 villages	<ul> <li>Current average holding 0.55 ha</li> <li>64% of farms were below 0.5 ha in 2007</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Perennial zone</li> <li>Have access to irrigation</li> <li>Cash crops: sugarcane, chat and coffee</li> <li>Food crops: Maize and enset</li> </ul>	Good road access to towns of Awassa and Shashemene	<ul> <li>60% Sidama ethnicity</li> <li>23% Oromo ethnicity</li> <li>90% Protestant</li> </ul>
SNNP	Damot Sore (Wollaita) 4 villages	- 67% of farms were below 0.5 ha in 2007	<ul> <li>Perennial zone</li> <li>Rain-fed subsistence         agriculture</li> <li>Main crops: Enset maize,         root and tuber crops</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Relatively remote area</li> <li>Road access to towns not good</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>97% Wollaita ethnicity</li> <li>50% Protestant</li> <li>45% Orthodox Christian</li> <li>Densely populated and poor</li> </ul>

Figure A 1 Map of Ethiopia and location of the urban centers under study



Figure A 2 GPS map location of youth stationed in Addis Ababa. January 2014

